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I.  AN HONEST DAY’S WORK: THE FACE OF ILLEGAL 
MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 
“For me it has been very hard.  But I know I am not alone.”1  Like so 
many others, Elvira Arellano entered the United States illegally in search 
of a better life, but her particular experience has made her the face of the 
illegal alien’s struggle in America.2  Elvira’s public plight has been 
likened to that of Rosa Parks or a “persecuted pilgrim out of the middle 
ages.”3 
Elvira, a Mexican national, moved to the United States in 1997, first to 
Oregon, and later Chicago, where she worked at O’Hare International 
Airport cleaning planes.4  For years, Elvira paid income taxes and Social 
1. Elvira Arellano Says U.S. ‘Broke The Law First’, LIVELEAK (Aug. 22, 2007),
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d69_1187877604&p= (transcript on file with author). 
2. See Associated Press, Boy Fighting Mom’s Battle to Stay in U.S., CBS NEWS
(July 2, 2010, 11:40 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/14/world/main218 
1120.shtml. 
3. Daniel Hernandez, Remember the Immigrant-Rights Movement?, LA WEEKLY
(Aug. 23, 2006), http://www.laweekly.com/2006-08-24/news/remember-the-immigrant-
rights-movement/. Rosa Parks earned the title the “Mother of the Civil Rights Movement” 
for her efforts in the fight for equality in the mid twentieth century. See LOLA M. 
SCHAEFER, ROSA PARKS 21 (Gail Saunders-Smith ed. 2002).  Police arrested Ms. Parks 
after she refused to give up her seat on the front of a city bus to a white man, in violation 
of an Alabama segregation law. Id. at 16.  Ms. Parks’s arrest led to a year long bus 
boycott by African-Americans in the Alabama town. Id. at 17.  Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court ruled bus segregation laws were unconstitutional. Id. at 19. 
4. Associated Press, supra note 2. Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, the
United States’ only dual hub airport (United Airlines and Delta Airlines both use O’Hare 
as a major hub location) sees over 75 million passengers and 1.7 million tons of freight 
and mail per year, generating over 500,000 jobs in the region and $37 billion per year in 
economic development. O’Hare International Airport History, http://www.flychicago. 
com/About/History/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). 
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Security deductions.5  In 1999, Elvira gave birth to a baby boy named 
Saul,6 who was born a United States citizen.7 
In 2002, immigration agents arrested Elvira during a raid at O’Hare.8  
Ultimately, she suffered a conviction for illegally working under a false 
Social Security number.9  After serving three years of probation, an 
immigration judge ordered Elvira’s removal.10  Her case fell under the 
international spotlight when in response to the removal order, Elvira 
sought protection through the rarely invoked principle of sanctuary.11 
She took up residence with Saul in a Chicago church, which sparked a 
wave of sanctuary immigration cases.12  After living in the church for a 
5. See Ed Pilkington, US Deports Mother Who Took Sanctuary, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 20, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/21/usa.edpilkington.  Elvira 
asserts that “the United States is the one who broke the law first.  By letting people cross 
over without documents.  By letting people pay taxes.” Elvira Arellano says U.S. ‘Broke 
The Law First’, supra note 1. 
6. See Jeff Goldblatt, Son of Deported Immigration Activist Urges Congress to
Bring Mom Back to America, FOX NEWS (Sept. 12, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
story/0,2933,296621,00.html. 
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside.” Id.  In 2008 and 2009, 350,000 children were born in 
the United States to parents illegally present in the country. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera 
Cohn, Pew Research Ctr., Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State 
Trends: 2010, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, 1 (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://pewhispanic. 
org/files/reports/133.pdf.  For a discussion of “anchor babies” in the United States and 
perspectives on both sides of the discussion, see Mariana E. Ormonde, Debunking the 
Myth of the “Anchor Baby”: Why Proposed Legislation Limiting Birthright Citizenship 
in Not a Means of Controlling Unauthorized Immigration, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 861 (2012). 
8. Associated Press, supra note 2.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Hernandez, supra note 3.
12. See id.  Elvira’s revival of the use of the sanctuary principle led to the
beginning of a modern sanctuary movement where aliens in sixteen states sought refuge 
from immigration authorities in churches. Pilkington, supra note 5; see also Daniel 
Hernandez, Broken Sanctuary, LA WEEKLY (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.laweekly.com/ 
2007-08-23/columns/broken-sanctuary/.  By the black letter law, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act prohibits “smuggling, harboring, transporting, or encouraging of illegal 
aliens.” Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous 
Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 748 
(1986).  Nonetheless, many churches throughout the United States open their doors as 
safe houses for illegal immigrants from the immigration authorities. Id. at 747.  This is a 
modern evolution of the Church’s “ancient function” as a holy place of refuge for 
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year,13 Elvira left to attend an immigration rally in Los Angeles, where 
immigration agents arrested and removed Elvira to Mexico.14  No longer 
able to live in the United States, Elvira had to choose between leaving 
young Saul behind at his only home in the United States, and bringing 
him to Mexico.15 
Elvira and Saul desperately wanted their old life back in the United 
States.  Saul, then an elementary school student, appeared in front of 
Mexico’s Congress to ask for the Mexican government’s help persuading 
the United States to allow his mother to stay in the United States.16  The 
Mexican Chamber of Deputies unanimously agreed to help Saul and 
Elvira; they appealed to President Bush to suspend Elvira’s deportation 
and the deportation of illegal immigrants with children who are United 
States citizens.17  Unfortunately, the United States did not grant Mexico’s 
call for suspension of Elvira’s removal.18 
Those in favor of Elvira’s removal argue that in misusing a Social 
Security number, she broke United States’ laws and has no business being 
in the United States.19  Rosanna Pulido of American Hispanics Against 
Illegal Immigration criticized Elvira, “[She] has really been a terrible 
poster child for this cause; she broke into the country twice, she stole 
American jobs.  She stole identities.”20 
criminals hoping to escape legal vigilante justice; for example, Ancient Greek temples 
offered what is described as divine protection for criminals. Id. at 751. 
13. Pilkington, supra note 5.  Elvira’s place of refuge was Adalberto United Methodist
Church of Chicago, Illinois, led by Reverend Walter Coleman. Id. 
14. See Goldblatt, supra note 6.
15. Associated Press, supra note 2.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See Goldblatt, supra note 6.
19. See id.
20. Id.  See GOP Not Fully Embracing Their Candidate for Congress, NBC CHICAGO 
(Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/GOP_Not_Fully_Embracing_Their_ 
Candidate_for_Congress_Chicago.html (transcript on file with author). Pulido, herself of 
Mexican heritage, is a founder of the Minutemen, a group of civilian citizens acting as a 
vigilante border patrol posse to prevent illegal immigration. Id. Pulido’s immigration 
philosophy is based on the theory that legal immigrants and citizens go jobless while 
employers hire illegal aliens in their place. Id.  When Congressman and current Mayor of 
Chicago, Rahm Emmanuel vacated his seat in Congress to serve as Chief of Staff to 
President Obama in 2009, Pulido won the Republican special election primary for the 5th 
Congressional district of Illinois.  Id.  However, negative publicity spread surrounding 
Pulido’s reference to Mexicans as “The Ku Klux Klan with the tan” leading Pulido to 
receive little financial support from her Republican party.  Id.  Ultimately Pulido lost the 
special election and Emanuel’s vacated Congressional seat was filled by Democrat Mike 
Quigley, who captured nearly 70% of votes. Id.; IL – District 05 —Special Election, OUR 
CAMPAIGNS (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RaceID= 
489029. 
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Meanwhile a disagreement has developed between the federal circuit 
courts over the very question of law that Elvira’s case poses: is the misuse 
of a Social Security number for an otherwise legal purpose—otherwise 
lawful employment—a crime involving moral turpitude?21  Because 
convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude subject aliens to removal, 
resolution of the circuit split could lead to nationwide law that clarifies 
whether aliens like Elvira need to be deported.22 
This Comment questions whether the misuse of a Social Security 
number for an otherwise legal purpose is a crime involving moral turpitude.  
It begins with a history of moral turpitude and its initial connection to 
immigration law in the United States.  Through a close analysis of misuse 
of a Social Security number for an otherwise legal purpose as a crime 
involving moral turpitude in modern cases, this comment will examine 
the role of fraud and dishonesty in the question.  The analysis reveals a 
critical distinction between crimes involving dishonesty and crimes 
involving fraud.  This distinction shows that crimes involving naked 
dishonesty, that is, crimes that involve dishonesty but do not involve 
fraud, namely misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise legal 
purpose, need not be classified as crimes involving moral turpitude 
under the law. 
II. THE PROBLEM: LACKING STATUTORY DEFINITION
Aliens who commit a crime involving moral turpitude are ineligible 
for admission to the United States under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) section 212.23  Furthermore, INA section 237 provides that 
21. See generally Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000); Hyder v.
Keisler, 506 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2007). 
22. Elvira may have been able to avoid removal for other reasons; when an alien
is ordered removed, relief still may exist through cancellation of removal proceedings for 
various reasons under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).  Additionally, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 could 
provide an alien relief under registry, as the alien in Beltran-Tirado sought. See Beltran-
Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1181.  However, because Elvira entered the United States after 1979, 
she was rendered ineligible for registry. See id. 
23. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)
(2006). “Aliens . . . are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted . . . any 
alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts 
which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude . . . or an 
attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime.”  Id.  Exceptions apply for juvenile offenses 
dating more than five years from the date of application for admission and certain non-
felonies.  Id. at § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
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aliens already present in the United States who suffer a felony conviction 
for a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of admission or 
who suffer a second conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude 
may be subject to removal.24  Although a finding of removability does 
not necessarily lead to ejection from the United States,25 an alien faces a 
very great risk of removal once the moral turpitude label affixes.26  
Because conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude carries the 
heavy potential consequence of removal or inadmissibility, accurately 
determining moral turpitude’s proper application is of the utmost 
importance. 
Unfortunately, despite this importance, “interpretation of ‘moral 
turpitude’ has become enshrouded by an impenetrable mist.”27  Because 
the term moral turpitude lacks a clear-cut statutory definition, the 
responsibility of defining the term and determining the situations in 
which it applies falls on the courts.28  However, despite being charged 
with the task, the courts operate under little guidance.29  Courts have 
noted that moral turpitude has “no satisfactory definition.”30 Particularly, 
because it is a moral concept rather than a legal concept, noncitizens’ 
right to remain in the country are subject to ever-changing societal norms 
and the subjective personal views of judges, all of which vary by 
jurisdiction and leads to inconsistent results.31 
24. See INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
25. See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (allows the United States Attorney
General to cancel removal for an inadmissible or deportable alien).  Removal may be 
withheld for other reasons, such as asylum for persecution. See Elizaveta Kabanova, The 
Supreme Court’s Take on Immigration in Nken v. Holder: Reaffirming a Traditional 
Standard that Affords Courts More Time and Flexibility to Decide Immigration Appeals 
Before Deporting Aliens, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUD. 183, 192 (2010). 
26. See Deportation 101: A Community Resource on Anti-Deportation Education
and Organizing, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT (May, 2010), available at http://www. 
nationalimmigrationproject.org/Deportation101_LowRes_January_2011.pdf. The Department 
of Homeland Security reports that ICE detained over 363,000 noncitizens in 2010 and 
approximately 387,000 were removed in the same year. Annual Report, UNITED STATES
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2013). 
27. JANE PERRY CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO
EUROPE 171 (Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University eds., 1931) (1969). 
28. See Brian C. Harms, Redefining “Crimes of Moral Turpitude”: A Proposal to
Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 259 (2001). 
29. Id. at 259–60.
30. Gibson v. Ferguson, 562 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tenn. 1976) (discussing crimes of
moral turpitude in the context of moral turpitude as grounds for disqualification from 
obtaining a liquor license). 
31. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 171; United States ex rel. Manzella v.
Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (explaining that moral turpitude is not 
clearly defined because it refers to changing moral standards rather than legal standards). 
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It is quite problematic that in a noncitizen’s interaction with the United 
States as a foreigner, he would face a different immigration penalty for 
the same offense across different jurisdictions and judges within the 
United States.32 But this is the result of the current schema where 
different rules have developed for different arbitrary internal boundaries.33  
The problem with moral turpitude would subside if courts were not 
placed in the perilous position of independently defining the term moral 
turpitude on a case-by-case basis. Because courts are better suited to 
effectively apply legal standards, when courts attempt to apply 
moral standards without statutory guidance, one cannot expect a precise 
or uniform definition of the term moral turpitude to evolve.34 Nonetheless, 
despite frequent Congressional dissatisfaction over the years,35 moral 
turpitude remains the standard, however dissatisfying the inconsistent 
results may be.36 
See also Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude is Void for 
Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 678–79 (2012) (arguing that granting judges broad 
power over a moral rather than a legal determination “places them in the role of God, 
passing judgment on the morals of the noncitizens. . .”). 
32. See CLARK, supra note 27.
33. Id.  Note that these are not sovereign boundaries such as states or nations. See
generally Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries—Why the Proposal to 
Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 
22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917 (1990). In contrast to states or nations, circuit boundaries are 
arbitrary and “Congress has redrawn [them] quite regularly.” Id. at 918.  The first circuit 
boundaries were drawn in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and over the next two centuries, 
Congress continued to expand the circuits in number and occasionally reassign states to 
different circuits. Id. at 919, 922.  The arrangement of the present thirteen circuits—
eleven regional plus D.C. and the Federal Circuits—was implemented in 1982. Id. at 922. 
34. See generally Annotation, What Constitutes “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude”
Within Meaning of § 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (a)(9), 
1251(a)(4)), and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of 
Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480, 491–92; CLARK, supra note 27, at 
171. 
35. See 142 CONG. REC. S4058-59 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1996) (where Senator Bob
Dole describes the phrase moral turpitude as “vague” and “lack[ing] the certainty we 
should desire.”); Derrick Moore, Note: “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the 
Void-For-Vagueness Argument is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
813, 823 (2008). 
36. See Moore, supra note 35, at 823; see also INA §§ 212, 237.
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A. Statutory History of Moral Turpitude 
The term moral turpitude first appeared in American jurisprudence to 
describe slander in an 1809 civil case.37 Throughout the latter half of the 
19th century, use of the term moral turpitude grew alongside increased 
immigration policies that sought to exclude immigrants who had marks 
on their moral report cards, such as prostitutes, “lewd and debauched” 
women or repeat criminal offenders.38 
The term moral turpitude first appeared in immigration legislation in 
1891.39  However, despite the term’s “deep roots in the law,”40 from the 
initial appearance in the 1891 Immigration Act to present day, the term 
has never been statutorily defined.41 The Act of March 3, 1891, made 
inadmissible to the United States, “persons who have been convicted of 
a felony or other infamous crime involving moral turpitude.”42  Additionally, 
from the onset of its statutory use, it was unclear if the term’s purpose 
was to synthesize the collection of attributes that previously rendered 
aliens inadmissible, or instead to create an entirely new criterion for 
admissibility.43 
Not only did moral turpitude lack a statutory definition and a definitive 
purpose, but Congress introduced the term to immigration law “without 
even Congressional comment in the accompanying reports,” which made 
ascertaining a definition through legislative intent difficult.44  When the 
term was introduced to immigration legislation in 1891, lawmakers 
37. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 167 n.5. The term has no root in English
common law, and apparently legal use never traveled back to English courts after usage 
began in American courts. Id.  See generally, Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188 (N.Y. 
1809) (Plaintiff alleged that defendant slandered her with accusations that she was a 
prostitute, a liar, and had borne a bastard child.  For the accusations to be found slanderous, 
they would have to have subjected the target to charges for a crime of moral turpitude if 
true.). 
38. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
93–94 (2010). 
39. See Holper, supra note 31, at 649; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat.
1084. 
40. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951).
The presence of moral turpitude has been used as a test in a variety of 
situations, including legislation governing the disbarment of attorneys and the 
revocation of medical licenses . . . as a criterion in disqualifying and impeaching 
witnesses, in determining the measure of contribution between joint tort-feasors, 
and in deciding whether certain language is slanderous. 
Id. 
41. See Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1996).
42. Holper, supra note 31, at 649 (quoting Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat.
1084) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 168.
44. Harms, supra note 28, at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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wrestled with the country’s moral dilemma of staying true to the nation’s 
roots as a place of refuge for foreign victims of political oppression, while 
simultaneously preventing entry of the truly undesirable.45  Building 
upon past immigration policies that focused on excluding the morally 
unclean, Congressional hearings from 1891 recommended that immigration 
laws “separate the desirable from the undesirable immigrants, and to 
permit only those . . . [to] land on our shores who have certain physical 
and moral qualities.”46  By inserting the term moral turpitude in the 1891 
Act, Congress sought to strike a reasonable balance between those 
competing goals of excluding the morally undesirable while maintaining 
some of the nation’s humanitarian motives of being a place of refuge.47 
In 1917, commission of a crime involving moral turpitude became 
grounds for an alien’s deportation from the United States.48  The nation’s 
sovereignty was often a sufficiently compelling justification for such 
expulsions.49  Citizen support for such deportation policies was strong, 
as the general public sentiment at the time was that increased immigrant 
presence was to blame for rising crime levels.50  The Act of February 5, 
1917 provided deportation for (1) any alien who committed a felony 
involving moral turpitude within five years of admission to the United 
States, or (2) an alien who commits any second crime involving moral 
turpitude after admission to the United States.51  Similar to the 1891 Act, 
45. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 161–62.  Bailey discusses the inscription at the
pedestal of the Statue of Liberty, which is “the main gateway to America.” PAUL BAILEY,
THE STONE KINGDOM 655 (2001).  The inscription reads “Give me your tired, your poor, 
your huddled masses yearning to breathe fee, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore.  
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
46. KANSTROOM, supra note 38, at 115 (quoting Special Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., Rep. (ii) (1891) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
47. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 162.
48. See Holper, supra note 31, at 650 n.13; Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 3, 19,
39 Stat. 874, 875, 889–90. 
49. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).  National
sovereignty was previously the justification for denial of admission as well.  Where there 
is a sovereign, there is an inherent power, “essential to self-preservation” to deny entry 
of foreigners. Id. at 705 (quoting Nishimora Elkin v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 
(1892)). 
50. See KANSTROOM, supra note 38, at 133.
51. See Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 3, 19, 39 Stat. 874, at 889.  The act did
have some mitigating factors that favored preservation of aliens’ rights, such as 
implementing a pardon as a defense to deportation and allowing sentencing judges to 
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in the 1917 Act, Congress continued the problematic trend of relying on 
the term moral turpitude to determine aliens’ admissibility and removability, 
but omitting a statutory definition.52 
The term moral turpitude was addressed once again in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952.53  The 1952 Act modified the moral turpitude 
provisions of the prior Acts, removing references to the specific crimes 
that involve moral turpitude, leading to the inference that moral turpitude 
was to be used as a new criteria instead of a synthesis of all offenses that 
were previously grounds for denial of entry or removal.54  Additionally, 
the act broadened the power to exclude; aliens who had committed “acts 
which constitute the essential elements” of crimes of moral turpitude 
became inadmissible.55 
With the 1952 Act, Congress sought to make exclusion “less amenable 
to a flexible application” and to more clearly distinguish desirable from 
undesirable immigrants.56  Immigration officials themselves objected to the 
1952 Act because of continued problems with the term moral turpitude.57  
President Truman complained that the new law “would result in empowering 
minor immigration and consular officials to act as prosecutor, judge, and 
jury in determining” the scope of moral turpitude.58  Moral turpitude was 
too broad a term, and without some statutory explanation, the applicability 
continued to depend on subjective individual beliefs.59  Following the 
1952 Act, moral turpitude became the single highest cause of visa refusals 
when compared to the other grounds for exclusion.60 
Forty-four years after the 1952 Act, Congress enacted the most recent 
pieces of major immigration legislation: the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
issue a binding recommendation against deportation. See KANSTROOM, supra note 38, at 
133–34.  Compare the Act of 1917, with the present day INA §§ 212, 237. 
52. See Holper, supra note 31, at 650–51.  See also Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S.
223, 233–34 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting Representative Sabath’s remarks 
that the term moral turpitude is deficient due to its lack of a clear definition). 
53. See Moore, supra note 34 at 822. This version of the Act wasn’t passed as
smoothly as previous versions. President Truman vetoed it, but the veto was overcome 
by a supermajority of the Senate. Id. 
54. See id.; supra note 43, and accompanying discussion.
55. Id. Previously, a conviction was necessary. See The Act of March 3rd, 1891,
ch. 551, § 1, 29 Stat. 1084 (1891). 
56. Harms, supra note 28, at 264.
57. See Holper, supra note 31, at 651.
58. Moore, supra note 35, at 822.
59. Holper, supra note 31, at 651.
60. See Harms, supra note 28, at 263 (citing STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 102, 102 (Comm. Print. 
1988). 
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Responsibility Act, both of which left the previous 1952 treatment of 
crimes involving moral turpitude largely untouched.61  The INA provides 
the current statutory law, which renders inadmissible any aliens convicted 
of a crime involving moral turpitude or who admit to acts constituting 
the elements of a crime of moral turpitude.62  For aliens present in the 
United States, a single felony involving moral turpitude within five years 
of admission, or any two crimes involving moral turpitude from different 
courses of conduct, are grounds for removal.63  Congress still declines to 
statutorily define the term moral turpitude.64  As such, despite widespread 
concern surrounding the term’s meaning, it is left to judicial interpretation.65 
B.  History of Moral Turpitude Decisional Law 
Because of the lack of a statutory definition, independent courts and 
judges have provided the only definition of moral turpitude, resulting in a 
hodgepodge of piecemeal case law offering little guidance and frequent 
inconsistency.66  The courts’ common definition of moral turpitude is “an 
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which 
a man owes to his fellow man.”67  But the mere fact that conduct is 
forbidden by criminal law, or is felonious, or is malum in se,68 without 
more, is insufficient for a finding of moral turpitude.69 
61. See Holper, supra note 31, at 652–53.
62. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1994).
63. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1999).
64. See Harms, supra note 28, at 259.
65. See Harms, supra note 28, at 264.  Harms argues that reliance solely on
judicial interpretation is contrary to the stated legislative purpose behind the Acts of 
1891, 1952 and 1996, where Congress sought to make exclusion ‘less amenable to a 
flexible application’ and to more clearly distinguish desirable from undesirable immigrants. 
Id. 
66. See Annotation, What Constitutes “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude” Within
Meaning of § 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (a)(9), 
1251(a)(4)), and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of 
Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480; CLARK, supra note 27, at 171. 
67. See Annotation, What Constitutes “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude” Within
Meaning of § 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C.S. 
1882(a)(9), 1251(a)(4) (1917), and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion 
or Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480. 
68. Malum in se traditionally refers to crimes that derive their wrongfulness from
God or an utmost authority superior to all manmade authority. Stuart P. Green, Why It’s 
a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of 
Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1570 (1997).  Malum prohibitum refers to 
crimes that derive their wrongfulness by the manmade authorities such as the criminal 
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Examples of inter-jurisdictional case law inconsistency illustrate the 
problems caused by moral turpitude’s lacking definition.70  The First 
Circuit considered a conviction for stealing $15 to involve moral turpitude, 
rendering an alien deportable.71 But that same year a federal district 
court in New York held that a manslaughter conviction, which could 
include intentional killing, did not involve moral turpitude.72  The 
distinguishing factor between these two offenses was that misdemeanor 
petty theft was intrinsically and morally wrong,73 whereas manslaughter 
lacks evil intent and possibly commission of a willful act.74  In a later 
case, Justice Jackson wondered what result other than inconsistency one 
should expect; he cleverly opined that the term moral turpitude itself is 
redundant since the dictionary definition of turpitude is “moral wickedness 
or depravity,” therefore the term moral turpitude essentially means “morally 
immoral.”75 
Over the years, more inconsistency arose in the “attempt[] to [pluck] 
out a line of definition [where] the dots in the line often trace a zig-zag 
and devious course” due to different treatment for identical or highly 
similar crimes with respect to moral turpitude across jurisdictions.76  In 
Texas, two adults who were married to other people admitted to nearly a 
dozen sexual encounters with one another, but the district could found 
code.  Id.  See also Richard L. Gray, Eliminating the (Absurd) Distinction Between 
Malum in Se and Malum Prohibitum Crimes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1369, 1377 (1995) 
(suggesting that malum in se is synonymous with moral turpitude, and that no difference 
in function or definition exists in contemporaneous usage).  But see Castle v. INS, 541 
F.2d 1064, 1066 (4th Cir. 1976) (for usage of the compound phrase “moral turpitude per 
se”). 
69. See Annotation, What Constitutes “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude” Within
Meaning of § 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S. 
1882(a)(9), 1251(a)(4) (1917)), and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion 
or Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480; see also Moore, 
supra note 35, at 818. 
70. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 170.
71. See Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929).
72. See Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y. 1929); CLARK, supra note
27, at 167 n.1.  The conviction for second degree manslaughter in this case “expressly 
includes an act resulting in death without design to injure of effect death” as well as heat 
of passion deaths; therefore an alien with intent to kill or injure could also be found 
guilty of this second-degree manslaughter, but nonetheless avoid the moral turpitude 
label. Mongiovi, 30 F.2d at 826. 
73. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 165.
74. See id. at 167 n.1. But which alien would the average citizen like to see
removed: a petty thief or an intentional killer? 
75. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951).
76. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 164–66.
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that their conduct did not involve moral turpitude.77  However, in the 
same decade, an English woman was deported for committing a crime 
involving moral turpitude, when 14 years after her husband deserted her, 
she immigrated to Ohio and lived with an American man for some time 
but never officially divorced her husband.78  In another inconsistency, a 
district court in Pennsylvania held that aggravated assault and battery 
was not a crime involving moral turpitude, but in New York State it 
was.79  Similarly, whether assault with a deadly weapon is a crime involving 
moral turpitude depends on the jurisdiction.80  This comment focuses on 
the inconsistency between the Ninth81 and Second82 Circuits’ finding 
that misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise legal purpose 
does not involve moral turpitude, and the Fifth,83 Sixth,84 Eighth,85 Tenth,86 
and Eleventh87 Circuits’ decisions, which hold that such conduct does 
involve moral turpitude. 
C.  Modern Approaches to Determining Presence of 
Moral Turpitude 
1. Categorical Approach
Although the results often differ, in the last 100 years, immigration 
officials have relied on some form of the categorical approach to determine 
whether a crime involves moral turpitude.88  The categorical approach 
considers the elements of the alien’s conviction89 to see if all instances 
77. See Ex parte Rocha, 30 F.2d 823, 824 (S.D. Tex. 1929); CLARK, supra note
27, at 165–66. 
78. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 192–93.
79. See id. at 167.
80. See id. at 169.
81. See Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2000).
82. See Ahmed v. Holder, 324 F. App’x. 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2009).
83. See Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007).
84. See Serrato-Soto v. Holder, 570 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2009).
85. See Sohaib Bin Lateef v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 592 F.3d 926 (8th Cir.
2010). 
86. See Rodriguez-Heredia v. Holder, 639 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2011).
87. See Moreno-Silva v. U.S. AG, 481 F. App’x. 611 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
88. Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving Moral
Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 314 (2011); United States ex 
rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1914). 
89. Presumably, when guilty pleas are accepted in exchange for dismissal of other
counts with a Harvey waiver, the dismissed counts’ elements can be considered in the 
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of that particular criminal conduct are crimes involving moral turpitude, 
rather than looking at the specific facts of conviction90 or being swayed 
by a prosecutor’s gratuitous verbiage.91  The goal of the categorical 
approach is to effectuate a federal standard to ensure that state law does 
not take precedence in immigration proceedings, and to maintain an equal 
treatment of comparable criminal acts.92 
Traditionally, the categorical approach uses a two-step analysis to 
determine if the elements of an offense inhere in moral turpitude.93  The 
first step is a pure categorical approach, where only the elements of the 
crime of conviction control.94  If the convicting statute involves elements 
in which moral turpitude necessarily inheres, then the offense involves 
moral turpitude.95  If not, the analysis proceeds to step two. 
If the first step does not resolve whether moral turpitude inheres in the 
elements of the statute, there are two tests to apply for the second step.96  
The first test, the least culpable conduct test, looks at whether moral 
turpitude inheres in the lowest level of conduct that would satisfy the 
immigration judge’s assessment if the Harvey waiver’s effect were to transfer from 
criminal sentencing to immigration considerations. See People v. Harvey, 25 Cal. 3d 
754, 758 (1979) (holding that absent defendant’s waiver, it is improper and unfair for 
facts underlying counts dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement to be considered for 
enhancing or aggravating defendant’s sentence).  If not permissible in the categorical 
approach, consideration of the dismissed counts under a Harvey waiver could be appropriate 
in the modified categorical approach analysis. See Matter of Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709, 
714 (B.I.A. 1999). 
90. See Mylius, 210 F. at 863; see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590–93 
(1990). 
91. For a description of such concerns, see United States v. Carrollo, 30 F. Supp.
3, 7 (W.D. Mo. 1939). 
Whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude depends on its description 
as set out in the statute defining it and upon the material essentials of the 
indictment charging it. It certainly does not depend upon unnecessary adjectives, a 
zealous and over careful prosecutor may have added in the indictment to the 
essentials required by law nor upon the eloquent, perhaps even lurid, description of 
the offense by the prosecutor to court or jury. 
Id. 
92. Dadhania, supra note 88, at 325 (citing Matter of R—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 448
n.2 (B.I.A. 1954)).
93. See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 324 (as developed in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).
94. Dadhania, supra note 88, at 324.
95. See Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 84 (B.I.A. 2001).
96. See Dadhania, supra note 86, at 326; but see Dadhania, at 326, n.66 (citing
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007)) (using a third test called the ordinary 
common sense approach, the court looks to “the conduct encompassed by the elements 
of the offense, in the ordinary case,” but not the possibility that the least culpable level of 
conduct covered by the statute may not involve moral turpitude.).  Ironically, despite its 
appealing name, the ordinary common sense approach is the least frequently used test. 
See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 326 n.66. 
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statute’s elements.97  Every level of conduct to which the statute could 
apply must involve moral turpitude, otherwise no conviction under that 
particular statute will be held to involve moral turpitude.98  Therefore, if 
the minimum level of conduct possible that could amount to a conviction 
does not involve moral turpitude, then the statute fails the test and the 
noncitizen is found to have not committed a crime involving moral 
turpitude.99  Conversely, if the minimum level of conduct does involve 
moral turpitude, then that conviction, and all other convictions under that 
statute, will necessarily involve moral turpitude as well.100 
The second test, called the realistic probability test, considers whether 
there is a realistic probability that a prosecutor would apply the statute 
“to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of the crime,” in 
which case, the particular offense would not involve moral turpitude.101  
If, however, the statute is ambiguous in that crimes both involving and 
not involving moral turpitude could be prosecuted under the statute, then 
97. See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 326.  This test is used by the Second, Third,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits. Id. 
98. See Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 2008) (referring to the
test as the minimum conduct approach). 
99. See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 327, 335–36 n.108 (citing Sullivan v. State,
986 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). In Sullivan, a noncitizen defendant was 
convicted for touching the chest of a ten-year-old boy under a statute that covered much 
less intrusive contact upon a minor than sexual penetration. Sullivan, 986 S.W.2d at 710.  
Under the statute, it would have also been possible for a twenty-year-old woman to be 
convicted for dancing suggestively with a seventeen-year-old boy whom she reasonably 
believed to be older. See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 335 n.108.  The hypothetical 
woman’s behavior represents the minimum level of conduct punishable under the statute. 
Id.  This minimum level of conduct did not strike the court as inhering in moral 
turpitude, therefore, all levels of conduct proscribed by the statute could not involve 
moral turpitude. Id.  The original defendant’s touching the boy’s chest would thereby fail 
the least culpable conduct test, meaning, and therefore, his conviction under this statute 
could not be a crime involving moral turpitude. Id. 
100.  See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 327. 
 101.  Id. at 327–28 n.74. (citing Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 
(2007)).  The Supreme Court in Duenas-Alvarez ruled that a defendant can prove the 
realistic probability by pointing to a case, including his own, where a prosecutor applied 
the statute to conduct that does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.  Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 187.  In Duenas-Alvarez, the defendant was convicted of aiding and 
abetting a vehicle theft, but could not make a showing that the unintended “natural and 
probable consequences” that supported his aiding and abetting conviction created a 
realistic probability that a prosecutor could apply the statute to conduct outside of the 
generic theft offense.  Id. at 193.  His conduct was therefore determined to involve moral 
turpitude.  Id. 
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the test is not dispositive as to a lack of moral turpitude, and the analysis 
must continue to the next step.102 
2. Modified Categorical Approach
In the modified categorical approach, the court looks to more than the 
plain language of the statute.  The analysis expands on the categorical 
approach by additionally considering a predetermined, limited set of 
documents in the record of conviction, such as the indictment, judgment 
of conviction, jury instruction, plea, or plea transcript.103  The adjudicator 
may not look to facts outside of the record of conviction.104  Specifically, 
in order to maintain consistency across cases, the adjudicator may not 
consider facts presented to the trier of fact.105  For example, in Matter of 
Sweetser, the immigration court looked only at the record of the 
noncitizen’s conviction, not the facts underlying the offense.106  Ultimately, 
in this final test, the government bears the burden to show the limited, 
permissible facts constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.107 
3. Silva-Trevino Doctrine
In 2008, much to the chagrin of legal scholars and practitioners, and 
after over a century of limited categorical approaches to determining 
whether crimes involve moral turpitude,108 the Attorney General announced 
the Silva-Trevino doctrine, which introduced a third step to the moral 
 102.  See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 337.  See also Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 
102, 107 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that a statute is divisible when it encompasses 
conduct that both may or may not involve moral turpitude). 
 103.  See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Shepard v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (categorizing the plea document as including 
charging documents as well as the record of the plea’s factual basis). 
 104.  See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 330; see also Matter of Sweetser, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 709, 714 (B.I.A. 1999). 
105.  See Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 714. 
 106.  See id. The BIA in Matter of Sweetser used the same removal analysis as that 
of moral turpitude to determine if an alien’s conviction was an aggravated felony for 
purposes of removal litigation. Id. at 712.  The modified categorical approach is used in 
removal proceedings for various underlying reasons.  See Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 
45, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (using the modified categorical approach in removal proceedings 
based on an aggravated felony conviction); Wala, 511 F.3d at 109 (using the modified 
categorical approach in removal proceedings for convictions based on a conviction for a 
crime involving moral turpitude).  This approach furthers the goal of uniformity across 
all courts for treatment of similar offenses outlined in Matter of R—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 
448 n.2 (B.I.A. 1954). 
107.  See Conteh, 461 F.3d at 56. 
108.  See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 314. 
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turpitude analysis.109  After Silva-Trevino, the immigration judge may now 
consider “any additional evidence the adjudicator determines is necessary or 
appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question.”110  With 
Silva-Trevino, the previous limitations that prevented the immigration 
court from viewing the record and evidence supporting the conviction 
are essentially discarded, which significantly increases the risk of 
inconsistent application of the moral turpitude law.111  While the federal 
courts of appeals remain split on full use of the Silva-Trevino three-
prong categorical approach,112 some form of the categorical approach 
remains the standard in all United States courts in moral turpitude 
determinations.113 
IV. THE EXISTING CIRCUIT SPLIT114
A. Ninth Circuit: Beltran-Tirado v. INS 
“The borderline of ‘moral turpitude’ is not an easy one to locate.”115  
The initial case of this circuit split, Beltran-Tirado, , defines that line.116  
Ms. Beltran-Tirado moved to the United States at the age of eighteen, 
where she resided for over thirty years.117  In her early twenties, Ms. 
Beltran-Tirado found a Social Security card on a bus and used the identity 
of the card owner for purposes unavailable to her as a noncitizen, but 
were otherwise legal.118  For example, she obtained employment, got 
married, applied for DMV licenses, and accrued and satisfactorily paid 
109.  See id. at 335–36; Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 704 (A.G. 
2008). 
 110.  Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 704. The Attorney General argued that since 
moral turpitude is not an element of any crime, fact considerations are necessary to 
determine if conduct involves moral turpitude. Id. at 700. 
 111.  See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 324 (explaining that pure categorical approaches 
ensure uniform application of federal law). 
 112.  See Mata-Guerrero, 627 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 2008) (following the Seventh 
Circuit case, Silva-Trevino, in its entirety). But see Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 716 F.3d 
1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Silva-Trevino). 
113.  See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 314. 
 114.  The Author discovered this split in Circuit Review Staff, Current Circuit 
Split: Civil Matters: Immigration, 4 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 401, 401 (2008). 
115.  Quilodran-Brau v. Holland, 232 F.2d 183, 184 (3d Cir. 1956). 
116.  See Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2000). 
117.  See id. at 1182. 
118.  See id. 
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consumer debt in the form of a credit card and a home loan.119  Eventually, 
the citizen to whom the Social Security number belonged noticed 
irregularities with the Internal Revenue Service caused by income Ms. 
Beltran-Tirado had earned while working under the true owner’s Social 
Security number.120  The true owner contacted Ms. Beltran-Tirado and 
demanded that she stop using the Social Security number.121 
After three years of continued use of the Social Security number, Ms. 
Beltran-Tirado was arrested and ultimately convicted for false attestation 
on an employment verification form and falsely representing a Social 
Security number.122  Although such activity is clearly not law abiding, 
the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Ms. Beltran-Tirado “did not attempt to 
create any liability for [the Social Security card’s true owner] . . . [Ms. 
Beltran-Tirado] used the card to establish her own credit.”123  After Ms. 
Beltran-Tirado was sentenced, the INS sought removal.124 
Ms. Beltran-Tirado attempted to prevent removal by applying for 
registry status.125  The goal of registry statutes is to “regularize the status 
of long-resident aliens illegally in the country.”126  A long time resident, 
Ms. Beltran-Tirado was the type of candidate the legislature sought to 
target as a beneficiary from the registry statute,127 unfortunately, her 
registry application was denied for lack of good moral character because 
the immigration judge found her convictions relating to improper use of 
the Social Security card were crimes involving moral turpitude.128  The 
119.  See id. 
120.  See id. 
121.  See id. 
122.  See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b)(3) (criminalizing false attestation on an employment 
verification form); 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (criminalizing false representation of a 
Social Security number). 
123.  Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1182. 
 124.  See id. Ms. Beltran-Tirado was sentenced to ninety days imprisonment, ninety 
days in a halfway house, and five years probation. Id. But see § 408(a), which provides a 
maximum penalty of five years imprisonment; §1546(b), which provides a maximum 
penalty of five years imprisonment. 
125.  See Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1182; 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (providing that an 
alien may obtain a record of lawful admission if the alien is not inadmissible under INA 
§ 212(a) and the alien shows “(a) entrance the United States prior to January 1, 1972; (b)
has had his residence in the United States continuously since such entry; (c) is a person 
of good moral character; and (d) is not ineligible to citizenship and is not deportable 
under [terrorism provisions of the INA]”). 
126.  Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560, 569 (1964). 
 127.  “[8 U.S.C. § 1259] appears to have been designed to aid a person who has 
formed a substantial tie to the United States.” Ragini Shah, Sharing the American Dream: 
Towards Formalizing the Status of Long-Term Resident Undocumented Children in the 
United States, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 637, 658 (2008). 
128.  See Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1183; 8 U.S.C. 1259(c). 
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Board of Immigration Appeals [hereafter BIA]129 affirmed the ruling.130  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue: do the offenses of 
making a false attestation on an employment verification form and misuse 
of a Social Security number involve moral turpitude for purposes of 
section 212 of the INA?131 
Due to a lack of decisional law applying a categorical approach, the 
Ninth Circuit looked to the history of Congressional amendments behind 
the federal criminal statute for misuse of a Social Security number.132  In 
1990, Congress had amended the statute to include a subsection narrowly 
exempting permanent resident aliens from prosecution for past use of 
false Social Security numbers when used to facilitate otherwise lawful 
conduct.133  Although this section did not apply directly to Ms. Beltran-
Tirado because she was not a permanent resident alien,134 the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that this subsection’s “rationale illuminates the view of Congress 
concerning the lack of moral turpitude involved in Beltran[-Tirado]’s 
actions.”135  This amendment expresses Congress’s  intent to not identify 
misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise legal purpose should 
not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.136 
The amendment’s Congressional Conference Committee report shows 
that the exemption was intended to “apply only to those individuals who 
use a false [S]ocial [S]ecurity number to engage in otherwise lawful 
conduct.  For example, an alien who used a false [S]ocial [S]ecurity number 
 129.  “BIA is the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration 
laws.” Board of Immigration Appeals, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm.  The BIA has jurisdiction to hear immigration 
and homeland security appeals wherein the United States is a party and the opposing 
party is an alien, citizen or business.  Id.  BIA rulings may be overruled by federal courts 
or the attorney general.  Id. 
130.  See Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1179. 
131.  See id. at 1183–84. 
132.  See id. 
133.  See id; 42 U.S.C. § 408(e) (2006) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 408(d) 
(2004)). 
 134.  Ms. Beltran-Tirado sought lawful permanent residence through the registry 
process. Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1181.  However, the conviction for a crime involving 
moral turpitude precluded registration.  Id. at 1182–83.  Had the conviction occurred post 
registry, Ms. Beltran-Tirado most likely would not have been deportable because the 1990 
amendment to the statute precluded convictions by lawful permanent residents from 
being found to involve moral turpitude.  See 42 U.S.C. § 408(e). 
135.  Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1183. 
136.  See id. 
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in order to obtain employment.”137 The amended subsection exempts 
qualifying aliens from a finding that their misuse of a Social Security 
number for an otherwise legal purpose involved moral turpitude.138 
Despite failure to qualify for the exemption from prosecution for those 
offenses, the court reasoned that the legislature was clear in establishing 
that Ms. Beltran-Tirado’s misuse of a Social Security number for an 
otherwise legal purpose as well as her false attestation on an employment 
verification form are not crimes involving moral turpitude.139  The timing of 
her registry, whether it preceded or postdated the misuse of a Social 
Security number, is not relevant in the inquiry of morality of the conduct.140  
The morality of conduct is the same regardless of when it occurs, so 
once Congress legislated that the conduct does not involve moral turpitude, 
the legislation precluded any occurrence of that conduct from a finding 
that it involved moral turpitude.141  Therefore, Ms. Beltran-Tirado’s misuse 
of a Social Security number as well as false attestation on an employment 
verification form prior to registration were therefore not crimes involving 
moral turpitude because Congress declared them as such in the 1990 
amendment to the misuse of a Social Security number statute.142 
B.  Fifth Circuit: Hyder v. Keisler 
Seven years after Beltran-Tirado, in Hyder v. Keisler, the Fifth Circuit 
directly opposed the Ninth Circuit’s Beltran-Tirado holding.143  Hyder 
disregarded any consideration of some otherwise legal purpose underlying 
the misuse of a Social Security number and elected not to follow the 
reasoning that the morality of conduct does not change based on when it 
occurs.144  Hyder essentially held that due to the dishonest nature of the 
conduct, fraud was necessarily present in all  misuse of a Social Security 
number, and that the timing of the immoral act is significant.145 
 137.  Id. at 1183. “. . .with exceptions not relevant here.” Id. at 1184. Additionally, 
the statute’s 1990 amendment covers Ms. Beltran-Tirado’s other offense—false attestation on 
an employment verification form.  Id. at 1183–84.  See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964, at 
948 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2653 [hereinafter Conference Report]. 
 138.  See Conference Report at 948; Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1183.  Aliens qualify 
based on attainment of permanent residence status under either an amnesty or registry 
statute.  See Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1183. 
139.  See id. at 1183–84. 
140.  See id. 
141.  See id. 
142.  See id. 
143.  See Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 388 (5th Cir. 2007); Circuit Review Staff, 
supra note 114, at 401. 
144.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 393. 
145.  See Circuit Review Staff, supra note 114, at 401. 
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Kashif Hyder, a Pakistani citizen, came to the United States on a 
nonimmigrant visa as a toddler in 1985.146  When his visa expired, he 
remained in the country beyond the authorized timeframe without any 
further known illegal conduct until a family member obtained a Social 
Security card on his behalf.147  The Social Security card application 
deliberately included false information.148 Mr. Hyder received and later 
used the Social Security card to obtain a driver’s license  and state 
identification card, claiming that he thought the Social Security card was 
legitimate at the time.149  Mr. Hyder later entered a guilty plea to misuse 
of a Social Security number and received one year of probation.150 
Based on the conviction, removal proceedings began against Mr. 
Hyder.151  Mr. Hyder conceded that he was removable because he remained 
in the country past the expiration of his visa and he violated his status as 
a nonimmigrant visa issuee by obtaining paid employment152 but sought 
to remain in the country by applying for cancellation of removal by the 
Attorney General.153  The Immigration Judge determined that Mr. Hyder’s 
 
 146.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389. 
 147.  See id. 
 148.  See id.  The false information included assertions that Mr. Hyder was a lawful 
immigrant on a student visa, when in fact he had been illegally present in the country for 
fourteen years under the expired nonimmigrant visa.  Id. 
 149.  See id.  It is peculiar that Mr. Hyder’s guilty plea was permitted despite his 
claim that he lacked knowledge of the card’s illegitimacy.  Of interest would be the court 
transcript of the acceptance of the guilty plea and allocution.  The opinion reads, “Hyder 
claims that he was unaware that the social security card was fraudulent when these 
events occurred.” Id.  However, since Mr. Hyder entered a plea agreement, the issue of 
knowledge was presumably never litigated.  The criminal statute of Mr. Hyder’s conviction 
uses specific mens rea language: “willfully, knowingly, and with the intent to deceive.” 
42 U.S.C. § 408 (a)(7)(A) (2006).  Despite his claims to lack knowledge and intent, Mr. 
Hyder’s guilty plea to an offense with elements of knowledge and intent were 
nonetheless accepted. 
 150.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389; compare 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(A) with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 408(a)(7)(B).  The charge for making a false claim to United States citizenship was 
dismissed pursuant to Mr. Hyder’s plea agreement. See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389; see also 
18 U.S.C. § 911 (2006). 
 151.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389. 
 152.  See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006); id. at § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). 
 153.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389.  Cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents 
requires ten years of immediately preceding continuous presence in the United States, good 
moral character, no convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude, and establishment 
that deportation would lead to exceptional hardship to an immediate family member who 
is a citizen or lawful permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C § 1229b(b)(1); compare 8 U.S.C. 
1259(a), with 8 U.S.C. 1259(b). 
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conviction for misuse of a Social Security number was a crime involving 
moral turpitude, which prevented him from satisfying the cancellation 
statute’s ‘good moral character’ requirement.154  Upon appeal, the BIA 
affirmed the ruling, finding that misuse of a Social Security number for 
an otherwise legal purpose was a crime involving moral turpitude.155 
Upon a second appeal, the Fifth Circuit sought to determine if Mr. 
Hyder could satisfy the good moral character requirement to allow 
consideration of his application for cancellation of removal.156  In order 
to do so, the court needed to define moral turpitude with respect to misuse 
of a Social Security number for an otherwise legal purpose according to 
Fifth Circuit law.157  Because moral turpitude lacks a statutory definition, 
the Fifth Circuit looked to intracircuit case law involving forgery,158 
fraud,159 and dishonesty160 as crimes involving moral turpitude.161  The Fifth 
Circuit explained that all cases involving fraud or deception were crimes 
involving moral turpitude,162 therefore, when using the categorical approach 
to analyze the statutory definition of Mr. Hyder’s criminal offense, the 
element of “willful deceit” raised a red flag.163  Mr. Hyder’s conviction 
required that the defendant “willfully, knowingly, and with intent to 
deceive” falsely use a Social Security number.164  The key words 
“willful[] . . . decei[t]” were present in Mr. Hyder’s conviction, so the 
court determined that based on precedents involving fraud or dishonesty, 
Mr. Hyder’s offense must also be a crime involving moral turpitude.165 
Because Hyder was directly contrary to the Ninth Circuit ruling in 
Beltran-Tirado,166 the Fifth Circuit analyzed the Beltran-Tirado decision.167  
 
 154.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389; 8 U.S.C § 1229b(b)(1)(B). 
 155.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389. But see Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1184. 
 156.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 388–89; 8 U.S.C § 1229b(b)(1)(B). 
 157.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 390–91. 
 158.  See Balogun v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d 274, 278–79 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding 
forgery and fraudulent use of credit cards are crimes involving moral turpitude); Okabe 
v. I.N.S., 671 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding attempting to bribe an immigration 
agent is a crime involving moral turpitude). 
 159.  See Balogun, 270 F.3d at 278-79; Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951). 
 160.  See Fuentes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 724, 726 (5th Cir. 2007) (where 
smuggling aliens into the United States as a coyote was found to involve moral turpitude); 
Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2002) (where conspiracy to obtain 
fraudulent immigration documents coupled with false testimony under oath constituted a 
crime involving moral turpitude). 
 161.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391. 
 162.  See id. 
 163.  Id.  See Dadhania, supra note 88, at 324. 
 164.  Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391–92; 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(A) (2006). 
 165.  Hyder, 506 F.3d at 392. 
 166.  See Circuit Review Staff, supra note 114, at 401. 
 167.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 392–93. 
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The Fifth Circuit argued that Beltran-Tirado expanded a narrow exemption 
beyond its intended scope because the original statutory exemption was 
only intended to apply to aliens who had already used a registry statute 
to become lawful permanent residents.168  The Fifth Circuit also disagreed 
with the ruling in Beltran-Tirado, as to the relationship between timing 
and morality: “the mere fact that Congress chose to exempt a certain 
class of aliens from prosecution for certain acts does not necessarily 
mean that those acts do not involve moral turpitude in other contexts.”169  
Ultimately, based on binding precedents, the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
Mr. Hyder committed a crime involving moral turpitude by misusing a 
Social Security number, even if the misuse was to facilitate otherwise 
lawful conduct.170 
C.  Other Relevant Cases Disagreeing With the Ninth Circuit 
Following the Federal Circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 
as to whether the misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise 
legal purpose is a crime involving moral turpitude, more circuits considered 
the issue. 
In Lateef v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec.,171 the Eighth Circuit declined to 
follow Beltran-Tirado.172  After over two decades of residence in the United 
States, Mr. Lateef pled guilty to using an unlawfully obtained Social 
Security number in order to obtain a state identification card in Missouri.173 
This was the same statute as was at issue in the conviction in Hyder.174  
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning that the morality of conduct does not change over 
short time-periods.175  Therefore, Mr. Lateef committed a crime involving 
 
 168.  See id. at 393. 
 169.  Id.  See Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1184. 
 170.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 393. 
 171.  Lateef v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 592 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 172.  See id. at 930. 
 173.  See id. at 928; 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(A).  Mr. Lateef’s conviction occurred 
after 1991, therefore he was not covered by the Congressional exemption that made this 
offense not a crime of moral turpitude for some permanent residents. Lateef, 592 F.3d at 
930. 
 174.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389. 
 175.  See Lateef, 592 F.3d at 930–31; Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d  1179, 1184 
(9th Cir. 2000).  In Beltran-Tirado, the court determined that the timing of a noncitizens 
registry was not relevant in the inquiry of morality of the conduct.  Id.  That is, that which is 
moral is moral and that which is immoral is immoral, regardless of the date it occurred. Id. 
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moral turpitude, and the Eighth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in opposing 
Beltran-Tirado, holding that misuse of a Social Security number for an 
otherwise lawful purpose is a crime involving moral turpitude.176 
In Serrato-Soto v. Holder, the Sixth Circuit also declined to follow the 
Ninth Circuit and agreed with the Fifth Circuit in Hyder.177  Similar to 
the defendants in Hyder and Beltran-Tirado, Mr. Serrato-Soto was present 
illegally in the United States for eleven years when he was convicted of 
fraudulent use of a Social Security number in a Mississippi state court.178  
When immigration proceedings began, Mr. Serrato-Soto sought pre-
completion voluntary departure, but was ultimately determined to be 
ineligible because the BIA’s definition of moral turpitude included all 
misuse of a Social Security number, even if for otherwise lawful conduct.179  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied the categorical approach and concluded 
that because of the fraud label, all convictions under this Mississippi 
statute would necessarily involve moral turpitude.  Therefore, Mr. Serrato-
Soto’s conduct necessarily involved moral turpitude.180  The court rejected 
Beltran-Tirado and explicitly followed Hyder.181 
The Tenth Circuit found that misuse of a Social Security number for 
the otherwise legal purpose of obtaining employment was a crime involving 
moral turpitude although it did so without citing Hyder or the above 
similarly decided cases, in Rodriguez-Heredia v. Holder.182  Mr. Rodriguez- 
Heredia was convicted under a Utah’ criminal fraud statute with essential 
elements of knowing or intentional use of a Social Security number with 
fraudulent intent to obtain employment.183  Mr. Rodriguez-Heredia 
 
 176.  See Lateef, 592 F.3d at 931. 
 177.  See Serrato-Soto v. Holder, 570 F.3d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 178.  See id. at 687; MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-19-85 (2)(b)-(c) (LexisNexis 2012). 
A person is guilty of fraud . . . willfully, knowingly, and with intent to deceive, 
uses a Social Security account number to establish and maintain business or 
other records; or with intent to deceive, falsely represents a number to be the 
Social Security account number assigned to him or another person, when in 
fact the number is not the Social Security account number assigned to him or 
such other person. 
Id. Compare § 97-19-85 with 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7) (statutes that do not describe the 
conduct as fraud in their text). 
 179.  See Serrato-Soto, 570 F.3d at 688; 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2006) (where an 
alien is provided the opportunity to voluntarily exit the United States at his own expense 
prior to the commencement of removal proceedings). 
 180.  See Serrato-Soto, 570 F.3d at 690–91. 
 181.  See id. at 691–92. 
 182.  See Rodriguez-Heredia v. Holder, 639 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 183.  See id. at 1268; compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-1102(2)(a) (LexisNexis 
2012) (“a person is guilty of identity fraud when that person knowingly or intentionally 
uses, or attempts to use, the personal identifying information of another person, whether 
that person is alive or deceased, with fraudulent intent, including to obtain, or attempt to 
obtain, credit, goods, services, employment, any other thing of value, or medical 
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unpersuasively argued that the offense did not involve moral turpitude 
because he obtained little value from the act.184  Ultimately, the court relied 
on Supreme Court precedent holding that conspiracy to defraud the United 
States involved moral turpitude, regardless of the value gained.185  Because 
Utah’s state statute always requires fraudulent intent, Mr. Rodriguez-
Heredia’s offense necessarily involved moral turpitude.186 
In Moreno-Silva v. United States, a case with a factual scenario very 
similar to Elvira’s, the Eleventh Circuit held that misuse of a Social 
Security number was a crime involving moral turpitude.187  Mr. Moreno-
Silva was convicted of fraudulent use of a Social Security number and 
the government instituted removal proceedings against him.188 Mr. 
Moreno-Silva sought cancellation of removal based on the exceptional 
hardship his wife and children would suffer if he was removed to 
Mexico.189  Despite the immigration judge’s explicit acknowledgement 
that Mr. Moreno-Silva established exceptional hardship, the Immigration 
Judge denied his application for cancellation of removal due to his 
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.190 On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit noted that crimes involving dishonesty generally involve 
moral turpitude.  The court further reasoned that because dishonesty was 
an essential element of Mr. Moreno-Silva’s conviction for fraudulent use 
of a Social Security number, the BIA interpretation of the statute was 
 
information.”: (i) obtains personal identifying information of another person whether that 
person is alive or deceased; and (ii) knowingly or intentionally uses . . . that information 
with fraudulent intent . . . including to obtain . . . employment, [or] any other thing of 
value), with 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B). The difference between the Utah statute and § 
408(a)(7) is that the Utah statute expressly declares the described conduct to be fraud, 
whereas in the federal statute, Congress declined to do so. See § 76-6-1102; §408(a).  
The Utah statute defines fraud differently than the legal definition  the comment’s 
analysis assumes. See § 76-6-1102.  The Utah statute only requires obtaining any thing 
of value, whereas the legal definition the comment assumes requires inducing another to 
act to their detriment.  See § 76-6-1102; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 731 (9th ed. 2009).  
Since Congress did not characterize § 408(a)(7) as fraud, this comment’s analysis uses 
the legal definition of fraud. 
 184.  See Rodriguez-Heredia, 639 F.3d at 1268–69. 
 185.  See id. at 1269. 
 186.  See id; Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951). 
 187.  See Moreno-Silva v. United States Att’y Gen., 481 F. App’x. 611, 612 (11th 
Cir. 2012); Associated Press, supra note 2. 
 188.  See Moreno-Silva, 481 F. App’x. at 612; 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7). 
 189.  See Moreno-Silva, 481 F. App’x. at 612; 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). 
 190.  See Moreno-Silva, 481 F. App’x. at 612. 
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proper in determining that misuse of a Social Security number involved 
moral turpitude.191 
D.  Developing the Critical Distinction: The Second Circuit            
Agrees With the Ninth Circuit 
In Ahmed v. Holder, the Second Circuit used the categorical approach 
to examine the phrase ‘for any purpose . . . with intent to deceive’ within 
the federal misuse of a Social Security number criminal statute.192  The 
Second Circuit was unable to find moral turpitude is necessarily always 
involved in the conduct the statute the covers.193 
The court explained the critical distinction between intent to deceive 
and intent to defraud.194  The Second Circuit analogized Mr. Ahmed’s 
conduct to a homeowner who has no functioning alarm, but posts an 
alarm system warning sign as a means of deceiving burglars.195  Despite 
his act of deception, the homeowner defrauds no one.196  The Second 
Circuit found Mr. Ahmed’s conduct “distinguishable from the many cases 
holding crimes of fraud to be crimes involving moral turpitude” because, 
like the deceptive homeowner, one who misuses a Social Security number 
with intent to deceive to secure employment is not necessarily acting with 
intent to defraud.197  Because misuse of a Social Security number for an 
otherwise legitimate purpose falls under the less common occurrence of 
the offense, which does not necessarily involve fraud, the Second Circuit 
was not persuaded that the conviction for misuse of a Social Security 
number for an otherwise lawful purpose must involve moral turpitude.198 
 
 191.  See id. at 613.  The Eleventh Circuit solely relied on Itani v. Ashcroft to 
determine that dishonesty is necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude.  Itani v. 
Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215–16 (11th Cir. 2002).  In Itani, the defendant was convicted of 
misprision of his felony scheme to export stolen rental cars.  Id. at 1214.  This conduct 
was ruled a crime involving moral turpitude.  Id. at 1216.  It appears that the Eleventh 
Circuit, like the Fifth, did not distinguish between fraud and dishonesty, but rather applied the 
clearly fraudulent conduct involving moral turpitude in Itani to the dishonesty without 
fraud in Moreno-Silva to determine that Moreno-Silva’s dishonesty was a crime involving 
moral turpitude.  See Moreno-Silva, 481 F. App’x. At 613. 
 192.  See Ahmed v. Holder, 324 F. App’x. 82, 84 (2nd Cir. 2009); 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7). 
 193.  See Ahmed, 324 F. App’x. at 84. 
 194.  See id. 
 195.  See id. 
 196.  See id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  See id. at 83.  Ahmed was remanded for the BIA to determine if moral turpitude 
“should be construed to encompass any crime that includes intentional deception as an 
element.” Id. at 84.  Upon further review of the case post remand, the issue of moral 
turpitude was not addressed and petitioner’s appeal was denied on other grounds. See 
Ahmed v. Holder, 435 Fed. Appx. 13, 15 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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V.  WHY THIS SPLIT OUGHT TO BE RESOLVED: THE UNITED                        
STATES IS A SINGLE NATION 
A longstanding circuit split that involves such a critical issue as one’s 
right to remain in the country poses a significant problem.199  Immigration 
is a delicate international political issue with a direct impact on critical 
foreign relationships.200  The United States presents to the outside world 
one national border rather than thirteen circuit borders, and as such it is 
impractical to have different rules for different circuits on matters involving 
the United States’ relationships with foreigners.201  After all, when an alien 
is removed from the United States, the alien is removed from and 
 
 199.  See CLARK, supra note 27, at 171. 
 200.  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Matthew v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 
(1976). See also For decades, Mexico has been notorious for manufacturing and 
smuggling dangerous controlled substances into the United States. David Maung, Mexican 
Drug Trafficking (Mexico’s Drug War), N.Y. TIMES, (Oct 9, 2012), http://topics.nytimes. 
com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mexico/drug_trafficking/index.html. 
Alongside the dangers of these controlled substances come oppressive cartels, severe 
corruption and shocking violence. Tracy Wilkinson, Richard Fausset & Brian Bennett, 
U.S.-Mexico Drug War Partnership Under Calderon Broke New Ground, L.A. TIMES, 
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/28/world/la-fg-us-mexico-drug-
war-20121129. 
 201.  See id.; see also Ernst Freund The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 
YALE L.J. 437 (1921).  200 years ago, John Jay wrote in The Federalist Papers “[W]e 
have uniformly been one people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same 
national rights, privileges, and protection.” The Federalist No. 2, at 38–39 (John Jay) 
(ABA ed. 202).  However, when circuit splits on significant issues of federal law remain 
unresolved, John Jay’s vision falls short of fulfillment. See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional 
Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 
1138 (2012).  The particular importance of the United States’ relationship with Mexico is 
illustrated by the traditional meeting between all incoming United States presidents and 
the Mexican president. Brian Montpoli, Obama Meets with Mexican President, CBS 
NEWS, (Jan. 12, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-4717070-503544.html.  
To put the relationship in economic terms, Mexico is the United States’ third largest 
trading partner by volume, with over $30 billion USD per month in combined imports 
and exports, trailing only Canada and China. Top Ten Countries with which the U.S. 
Trades, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (July 18, 2013), http://www. census.gov/foreign-
trade/top/dst/2010/07/balance.html.  Additionally, the three North American nations are 
parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement. Ranko Shiraki Oliver, In the Twelve 
Years of NAFTA, the Treaty Gave to Me . . . What, Exactly?: An Assessment of Economic, 
Social and Political Developments in Mexico Since 1994 and Their Impact on Mexican 
Immigration into the United States, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 53, 54 (2007) (discussing 
the importance and pitfalls of NAFTA). 
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prohibited from reentering every state, not just the circuit that affirmed a 
removal order.202 
Those who do not call for a resolution of such circuit splits argue regional 
differences that facilitate fruitful social and political experimentation are 
inherent in and integral to an effective federalist system.203  However, 
these arguments are problematic when applied to the federal circuit system.  
The concept of independent federalist regions that serve as social and 
political laboratories was intended to apply to individual states, not multiple 
states grouped into appellate circuits.204  Furthermore, when differences 
in interpretation of the law arise, the nation is not served best by some 
greatly delayed, albeit more correct answer, but rather by a definitive 
answer.205  The Supreme Court itself has agreed with this rationale and 
 
 202.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1)–(2) (2013) (any alien under an order for denial of 
admission or removal who attempts to enter or is found anywhere in the United States is 
subject to a fine or imprisonment). 
 203.  See Jennifer K. Luse et al., Such Inferior Courts. . .: Compliance by Circuits 
with Jurisprudential Regimes, 37 AM. POL. RES. 75, 77–78 (2009).  These defenders of 
the split also point to the lack of a Constitutional requirement or evidence of framers’ 
intent for uniform national interpretation of federal law. Amanda Frost, Overvaluing 
Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1573–74 (2008); see Logan, supra note 201, at 116–63.  
The defenders argue that with regional political experimentation, unique circuit decisions 
are able to percolate—that is, to develop on their own in independent political 
laboratories, allowing the Supreme Court to observe the results of a course of action and 
arrive at a more informed ultimate decision.  Id.  Along the same vein, the political 
efficiency argument is that if citizens are displeased with their region’s preferences, they 
may “vote with their feet” by relocating to a region with ideals more aligned with their 
own.  Id. at 1163; see also DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S 
THIRD CENTURY 830 (4th ed. 2009). 
 204.  See Logan, supra note 201, at 1141.  Circuits lack the “sovereign dignity” that 
the several states enjoy, and in fact as members of a diverse circuit, state interests are 
actually vulnerable to being undermined by circuit rulings.  Id. at 1165–66.  The theory of 
geographic representativeness in the circuits suffers multiple flaws in its assumptions. Id. 
at 1164.  First, many judges are appointed from other regions to sit on a circuit, bringing 
with them to the new circuit their own ideals and beliefs. Id.  Second, the circuits are not 
as geographically aligned as one might assume.  Id.  For example, the First Circuit represents 
states from New England, as well as the vastly different Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; 
the Sixth Circuit spans from the upper Midwest with Michigan to the South with Tennessee. 
Id. 
 205.  See id. at 1170.  For an example of the turmoil caused by the lack of a majority 
opinion on a definitive issue, see generally Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  In Asahi, the Supreme Court considered the requirements 
for personal jurisdiction of foreign companies whose products are eventually sold in the 
United States, but ‘only helped to confuse’ what contact was required to establish 
personal jurisdiction in these products liability cases. Kristin R. Baker, Product Liability 
Suits and the Stream of Commerce after Asahi: World-Wide Volkswagen is Still the Answer, 
35 TULSA L.J. 705, 705–06 (2000).  The fractured Asahi court provided no majority 
opinion but three concurrences provided two nonbinding rules. Id.  Supporters of quickly 
resolving circuit splits additionally argue that the Supremacy Clause suggests a preference 
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specifically insisted that, while experimentation at times can be beneficial, 
Constitutional rights are improper laboratories for experimentation; it is 
better to give basic rights, a reliable consistent determination.206  One 
such basic right that needs a reliable consistent determination is the right 
to remain present in the United States.207 
Despite the argument that the right to presence in the country is not an 
issue fit for experimentation, the results of past regional differences in 
immigration policy have percolated to an extent worth considering.  In 
regions with high illegal immigrant presence, there are concerns that the 
increased immigrant population increases domestic unemployment and 
burdens public services.208  These concerns have led to the demonization 
and mistreatment of immigrant populations to an extent that is, arguably, 
on par with the United States’ mistreatment of African-Americans.209  
 
for judicial uniformity in the Constitution. See Logan, supra note 201, at 1171; U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  Although there is no express requirement for uniformity, Article III 
creates one Supreme Court tasked with final interpretation of federal law. See Logan, 
supra note 201, at 1171; see generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (solidifying 
judicial review and the ultimate power to interpret the constitutionality of federal laws).  
If uniformity was not preferable to the framers, then the Supremacy Clause and the role 
of the Supreme Court as the highest court would be without meaning. See Logan, supra 
note 201, at 1171. 
 206.  See Logan, supra note 201, at 1162; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 
(1921) (explaining that “the Constitution was intended, its very purpose was, to prevent 
experimentation with the fundamental rights of the individual”). 
 207.  See Shaughnessy v. United States ex re. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) 
(explaining that even aliens who are illegally present may be expelled only after proceedings 
affording the alien due process and fundamental standards of fairness). 
 208.  Compare Andrew Greene, Mexicans Are Stealing Our Jobs, QUINNIPIAC 
CHRONICLE, (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.quchronicle.com/2010/04/mexicans-are-stealing- 
our-jobs/, with Rosanne Skirble, Mexican Workers Take Jobs Few Americans Want, VOICE OF 
AMERICA, (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.voanews.com/content/mexican-guest-workers-take- 
jobs-few-americans-want-100873354/162095.html (arguing that United States citizens 
rarely desire the jobs typically filled by immigrant labor).  Additionally, concerns exist 
that immigration excessively burdens public services, such as education and health care. 
Howard Fischer, Bill Would Require Hospitals to Check Immigration Status, ARIZONA 
DAILY SUN, (Jan. 27, 2012), http://azdailysun.com/news/local/state-and-regional/bill-would- 
require-hospitals-to-check-immigration-status/article_a9ad6973-3227-552d-9816-82870b8fcf 
4e.html. 
 209.  See Hernandez, supra note 3; see also Paul Harris, Tensions Rise as Latinos 
Feel Under Siege in America’s Deep South, THE GUARDIAN, (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/21/racist-immigration-law-in-deep-south.  Proposals for new 
laws that may require immigrants to carry papers as proof of their legal status involve 
similar treatment as that of former slaves who faced oppression and harassment to show 
their papers.  Id.  Ironically, the immigrants in the fields of the southeastern states today 
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Indeed, many of the jobs allegedly taken from citizens by illegal aliens 
may be occupied by aliens who were only able to obtain their jobs through 
misuse of a Social Security number. 
In other respects, percolation of immigration policies that exclude 
aliens has shown that exclusionary policies have dramatic negative effects 
on local economies.  The parallel between mistreatment of illegal 
immigrants and African-Americans manifests again in the United States’ 
high level of dependence on the inexpensive immigrant population’s 
labor, similar to the United States’s past long reliance on inexpensive 
slave labor.210  When inexpensive immigrant labor is driven out by tough 
legislation and exclusionary policies, even in areas of high citizen 
unemployment, farmers see multi-billion dollar crop losses.  This drives 
up food prices in grocery stores and increases costs in all markets, 
hampering the United States competitive position in the global 
marketplace.211  Classifying the misuse of a Social Security number for 
 
provide radically inexpensive labor that the local economy is built upon, similar to the 
inexpensive slave labor that the colonial and early American economies relied upon.  Id. 
In Georgia, Alabama and South Carolina, new laws have been signed that 
represent the toughest crackdown on illegal immigrants—the vast majority of 
whom are Hispanics–in America. They give the police sweeping new powers 
and require them, and employers, to check people’s immigration status. In 
Alabama, they even make helping illegal immigrants, by giving them a lift in a 
car or shelter in a home, into a serious crime. 
Id.  See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-1051(B), 13-1059, 13-2928(C), 13-3883(A)(5) 
(LexisNexis 2010), which was the source of much controversy, particularly regarding 
racial profiling concerns. After United States Supreme Court review, the law now only 
requires state law enforcement agencies to check immigration status for all persons stopped 
when there is reason to believe the individual may be present in the United States illegally. 
See John Schwartz, Supreme Court Decision on Arizona Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
(June  26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/26/us/scotus-immigrationlaw- 
analysis.html.  Other components of the law, such as requiring immigrants to carry 
immigration registration papers were stricken by the highest court.  See id.; United States 
v. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502–03 (2012). 
 210.  See ARMSTEAD L. ROBINSON, BITTER FRUITS OF BONDAGE: THE DEMISE OF 
SLAVERY AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACY, 1861-1865 37 (2005); See also JOHN 
MAJEWSKI, MODERNIZING A SLAVE ECONOMY: THE ECONOMIC VISION OF THE CONFEDERATE 
NATION 84 (2011) (explaining that the United States’ pre industrial-age growth and prosperity 
was extremely dependent on slavery). 
 211.  See Alfonso Serrano. Bitter Harvest: U.S. Farmers Blame Billion Dollar 
Losses on Immigration Laws, TIME MAGAZINE BUSINESS AND MONEY, (Sept 21, 2012), 
http://business.time.com/2012/09/21/bitter-harvest-u-s-farmers-blame-billion-dollar-losses- 
on-immigration-laws/.  Because farmers cannot find enough help with their harvest in 
the wake of harsh immigration laws, some see up to 10% of their crop rot unharvested, 
seriously impacting their bottom line.  Id. 
Roughly 70% of the 1.2 million people employed by the agriculture industry 
are undocumented. No U.S. industry is more dependent on undocumented 
immigrants. But acute labor shortages brought on by anti-immigration measures 
threaten to heap record losses on an industry emerging from years of stiff 
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an otherwise legal purpose as a crime involving moral turpitude only 
aggravates these negative trends. 
Further percolation of localized immigration policies is observable in 
the effects of harsh, new immigration laws.  Immigration agents say, when 
state law enforcement detains an alien they will check the alien’s status, 
but not necessarily take action unless the alien fits their highest priorities, 
even if the alien is illegally present in the United States.212  This statement 
could be an interesting predictor of the effectiveness of a policy that 
uniformly makes misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise 
legal purpose a crime involving moral turpitude. 
Following up on political efficiency arguments,213 some justification 
for allowing splits to remain outstanding lies in the concern that instead 
of the search for true impartial interpretation of the law, differences in 
political philosophy are the true root of many court decisions.214  Indeed, 
at least partially due to varying morals, the determination of whether a 
certain crime involves moral turpitude depends on the geographic 
location of the court.215  The results reinforce the theory that the Ninth 
Circuit, which provided the Beltran-Tirado decision, is often criticized 
for its liberal slant.216  Conversely, the Fifth Circuit, which provided the 
 
foreign competition. Nationwide, labor shortages will result in losses of up to 
$9 billion, according to the American Farm Bureau Federation. 
Id.  See also Jay Bookman, Ga’s Farm Labor Crisis Playing Out as Planned ATLANTA 
JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, (June 17, 2011), http://blogs.ajc.com/jay-bookman-blog/2011/ 
06/17/gas-farm-labor-crisis-playing-out-as-planned/a (discussing severe labor shortages in 
southwest Georgia caused by tough immigration policies, where the state suggests criminal 
probationers as possible replacements for displaced immigrant laborers). 
 212.  See Associated Press, Judge Rules that Arizona Police Can Check Immigration 
Status, FOX NEWS (Sept 19, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/09/18/judge-
police-to-enforce-ariz-immigration-law-now/.  Checking status does not mean the federal 
government necessarily will expend limited resources that do not fit their  principle 
immigration enforcement priorities of legitimate threats to public safety or national 
security as well as repeat offenders.  Id. 
 213.  See Logan, supra note 201, at 1162–63. 
 214.  See Andreas Broscheid, Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of Appeals 
More Liberal or Conservative Than Others?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 171, 173 (2011).  
Broscheid’s article presents an interesting econometric study into the existence of actual 
political bias, and concludes that the popular sentiment that there is a weighty political 
bias is most likely “overblown.”  Id. at 189. 
 215.  See CLARK, supra note 27, at 166. 
 216.  See Broscheid, supra note 214, at 171.  Bill O’Reilly refers to the Ninth Circuit as 
the “wild bunch.” Id.  Granted, this may in some respects be a fair assessment; the Ninth 
Circuit’s mostly notorious wild judge, Alex Kozinski, has developed quite the reputation 
as a funny guy. See Scott Glover, 9th Circuit’s Chief Justice Posted Sexually Explicit 
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Hyder decision, is generally known as a conservative court and is often 
criticized for its perceived conservative bias.217  Generally, the Third and 
Ninth Circuits are considered the most liberal, while the Fourth, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eighth are considered the most conservative.218 
As one might expect, the lynchpins of the circuit split involving misuse of 
a Social Security number for an otherwise legitimate purpose are pitted 
at opposite ends of the spectrum.219  Whether this split exists due to inter-
circuit political differences or due to legitimate differing interpretations 
of the law, the United States presents a single border and a single nation 
to foreigners seeking entry or lawful residence.  As a single nation with a 
single border, a single set of laws governing that border is the most practical 
method to effectively manage foreign relationships and interacting with 
foreign citizens.220  Ordinarily, allowing an outstanding circuit split to 
percolate may be acceptable, but because basic rights are at stake and the 
issue involves the United States’ interaction with foreign individuals and 
nations, the United States, the Circuits and the several states within will 
be best served with a resolution to the application of moral turpitude to 
misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise legal purpose.221 
 
Material On His Website, L.A. TIMES, (June 11, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/local/ 
la-me-kozinski12-2008jun12,0,6220192.story; see also tdurden04,  Kozinski on the Dating 
Game (and Squiggy, too!), YOUTUBE, (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=OdjCdb GucCU.  Senator Orrin Hatch has characterized the Ninth Circuit as “judicial 
activism and overreaching . . . out of the mainstream of both American law and culture,” 
and Bruce Fein scolds the court as “manipulative judging at its worst” among others. 
Broscheid, supra note 214, at 171. 
 217.  See Broscheid, supra note 214, at 180. 
 218.  See id. at 171–72, 173, 186.  Similarly, Deborah Sontag of the New York 
Times described the Fourth Circuit as “the shrewdest, most aggressively conservative 
federal appeals court in the nation” and John Dean calls the court “the most conservative 
circuit court in modern American history.” Id.  The Fourth Circuit has yet to consider the 
question of whether misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise legitimate 
purpose involves moral turpitude. See Circuit Review Staff, supra note 114, at 401. 
 219.  See generally Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000). See 
Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2007); Sohaib Bin Lateef v. Dep’t. of Homeland 
Sec., 592 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2010) (the Eighth Circuit’s conservative decision to follow 
Hyder). 
 220.  See Logan, supra note 201, at 1141. 
 221.  If the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari, it is hard to predict how the 
Court would decide.  Although the appellate decisions covering this split have straddled 
the expectations of their geographical political ideologies, a potential United States 
Supreme Court decision regarding misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise 
legitimate purpose could rise above the traditional political factors often used to predict 
the rulings of our highest court. 
As the 2012 Obamacare decision illustrates, the Justices are willing to rock the boat by 
straying from their political roots. See National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (where conservative Chief Justice Roberts cast 
the decisive vote to uphold parts of the controversial health care law).  Similarly, in 
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VI.  WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT 
A.  Morality Exists Outside Short Term Temporal Constraints 
The strongest support for Beltran-Tirado is the irrefutable principle 
that once the morality of a particular conduct is determined, when the 
conduct occurs within a short time period does not change the morality 
or immorality of that conduct.222  In the 1990 amendment to the misuse 
of a Social Security number statute, Congress showed its clear desire 
that misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise legal purpose is 
not a crime involving moral turpitude.223  Morality is a timeless concept— 
that which is moral is moral and that which is immoral is immoral, 
regardless of when it occurs.224  Therefore, whether the misuse of a Social 
Security number occurred before or after an alien filed an application for 
permanent residence has no bearing on the morality of the misuse. 
The Fifth Circuit responded to this issue by looking at classes of aliens 
rather than the morality of the conduct.  However, that is not the proper 
inquiry for resolving the question these cases pose.  The question presented 
in Hyder asks not what class of alien Mr. Hyder falls into, but rather the 
question was whether misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise 
legal purpose was a crime involving moral turpitude, i.e. whether Mr. 
 
Arizona, conservative Justices Kennedy and Roberts joined the liberal majority ruling. 
United States v. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012).  For an interesting analysis of 
the Justices and a breakdown of their party affiliations and votes cast with respect to the 
big ticket decisions of the 2012 term, see Robert Barnes, After Supreme Court Term, 
Line Between Liberal and Conservative is Blurrier, WASHINGTON POST, (June 30, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/after-supreme-court-term-line-between-liberal-and-
conservative-is-blurrier/2012/06/30/gJQAbumcEW_story.html; see also Schwartz, supra 
note 208 (discussing University of Houston Law Professor Michael A. Olivas’s comments 
that anyone who hopes to restrict immigration should not be ‘relieved’ by the recent 
upholding of only one of four provisions of the Arizona law). 
 222.  See Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1183. 
 223.  See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7). 
 224.  Granted, societal mores and standards change over time.  At one time it was 
unheard of for an unmarried man and woman to be alone together at night.  Now rampant 
fornication, cohabitation and illegitimate children are ever present.  See Casey E. Copen, 
First Marriages in the United States: Data From the 2006-2010 National Survey of 
Family Growth, 49 NATIONAL HEALTH STATISTICS REPORTS 1 (Mar. 22, 2012), available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr049.pdf.  However, such changes take decades 
to unfold.  Id.  By choosing not to follow the Ninth Circuit, the morality of conduct 
literally hinges on the one-day period covering the days before and after the activation of 
the statute or granting of permanent residence status.  Morality does not change in such a 
short time frame.  Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1184. 
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Hyder’s conduct was moral.225  The court’s decision must hinge on the 
morality of the offense.  Where a court looks at morality of conduct, it is 
the morality of conduct that is probative, not the class of the actor.  The 
Fifth Circuit did not resolve the issue of how identical conduct could be 
moral at one time and immoral at another.  When the correct question is 
asked, the only sound conclusion is that misuse of a Social Security number 
for an otherwise legal purpose is not a crime involving moral turpitude. 
B.  Fraud Defined: The Ninth Circuit’s Beltran-Tirado and the Fifth 
Circuit’s Hyder Actually Did Not Involve Fraud 
Fraud is defined as “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or 
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her 
detriment.”226  In the very narrow case of an alien misusing a Social 
Security number for an otherwise legitimate purpose, such as otherwise 
legal employment or obtaining a driver’s license, the basic elements of 
fraud are not satisfied. 
The aliens in both Hyder and Beltran-Tirado satisfied the first prong: 
making a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a 
material fact.227  However, the second prong—induction of another to act 
to his or her detriment—remains unsatisfied.  At no point do the aliens in 
Hyder or Beltran-Tirado induce another to act to their detriment as 
required by the legal definition of fraud. 
The true owners of the Social Security numbers have not been induced 
to act in any way, and certainly not to their detriment.  Being passively 
affected is not the same as being induced to act.  In Beltran-Tirado, the 
true owner is akin to the victim of a car theft.  In a car theft, the car is 
taken without permission, but the true owner is not induced to act.228  
The car owner’s property was misappropriated, and they may sustain a 
loss, but they face no inducement to act.  Similarly, in cases such as 
 
 225.  “The question of law at issue in this case: whether the BIA properly classified 
the crime of misuse of a social security number under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(A) as a 
CIMT.”  Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 226.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 731 (9th ed. 2009). Granted, a colloquial definition of 
fraud may require only “an act of deceiving or misrepresenting.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fraud. But see Weiss v. United 
States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941) (“The law does not define fraud; it needs no 
definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versatile as human ingenuity.”). 
 227.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389; Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1182. 
 228.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 487(d)(1) (Deering 2012); see also CAL. VEH. CODE  
§ 10851(a) (Deering 2012) (auto theft requires taking, without consent, with intent to 
deprive, or alternatively complicity).  But see Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389 (where there was 
no misuse of the Social Security number of another, therefore no true owner exists to be 
potentially induced). 
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Beltran-Tirado, a Social Security number is misappropriated, without 
permission, but the true owner faces no inducement to act.229 
Similarly, the actions of Mr. Hyder and Ms. Beltran-Tirado do not 
induce any governmental agency to act to its detriment.  The government 
issues a Social Security number and card to a rightful owner, and the 
owner uses the card to certify that he or she is legally employable.230  
The government receives taxes allocated to a Social Security number.231  
When a Social Security number is misused in order to obtain employment, 
the government does not act to their detriment.  In fact, it does not act at 
all because the Social Security number has already been issued, and the 
government takes no further action.232 
A third potential actor could be the employer, such as Chicago O’Hare 
Airport, who hires the misuser of a Social Security number. There are 
civil and criminal penalties under federal law for employing an illegal 
alien.233  However,  the employer generally must have knowledge of the 
alien’s illegal status to be culpable.234  Where an employer hires an 
employee without knowledge of the employee’s illegal status, the employer 
does not act to his detriment in hiring the employee.  Instead, the employer 
merely enters an employment agreement that is like any other from the 
employer’s perspective.  Therefore,  the misuse of a Social Security number 
for an otherwise legal purpose does not satisfy the legal definition of 
fraud because no entity is induced to act to its detriment by the misuse of 
a Social Security number. 
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Hyder relied heavily on the concept 
that where there is fraud, there is a crime involving moral turpitude.235  
However, when the true fraudulent nature of misuse of a Social Security 
 
 229.  Also, unlike some car theft victims, the Beltran-Tirado victim suffered no loss. 
Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1182. 
 230.  See Why Do I Need One?, THE UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ssa.gov/ssnumber/ (last modified June 20, 2013); The Social 
Security Number Verification Service, THE UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.ssa.gov/employer/ssnv.htm (last modified Jan. 28, 2013). 
 231.  See id. 
 232.  In Hyder, the alien attempted to obtain a license to operate a motor vehicle.  In 
this case, the government does act when it issues the license. Hyder, 506 F.3d at 389.  
However, the issue of ‘to their detriment’ remains.  It is not the objective of a Texas 
DMV to ensure compliance with immigration laws. 
 233.  See INA § 274A(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1) (2006) (“it is unlawful . . . to hire . . . 
an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien”). 
 234.  See id. 
 235.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391. 
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number for an otherwise legitimate purpose is undermined by the lack of 
an inducement of another to act to their detriment, the Hyder reasoning 
loses its foundation.  If Mr. Hyder and Ms. Beltran-Tirado’s offenses did 
not involve fraud, their identification as crimes involving moral turpitude is 
unnecessary under the law. 
Further support for the lack of fraud in Hyder and Beltran-Tirado lies 
in the language of the underlying criminal statutes.236  Unlike many statutes 
that do involve fraud, the word fraud appears nowhere in section 
408(a)(7).237  The subsection requires only misuse or a misrepresentation, 
for any purpose, of a Social Security number.238  There is no further 
requirement of fraud, detriment to a third party, or personal gain required by 
section 408(a)(7).  Where criminal statutes are intended to cover fraud, 
the title or the elements of the statute explicitly use the word fraud.239  
These underlying criminal statutes plainly seek to criminalize deception 
with respect to a Social Security number, but do not seek to penalize fraud. 
VII.  NAKED DISHONESTY: DECEPTION WITHOUT                                            
FRAUD IS DIFFERENT 
Hyder and its progeny failed to consider the important distinction 
between fraud and deception.240  Where Hyder relies only upon instances 
of dishonesty that were simultaneously instances of fraud, Hyder did not 
consider instances of naked dishonesty, that is, an instance of dishonesty 
that was not an instance of fraud. 
Hyder relies on the principle that “we have repeatedly emphasized that 
crimes whose essential elements involve fraud or deception tend to be 
[crimes involving moral turpitude].”241  The opinion develops this by citing 
cases that supposedly fall into the named categories of either “fraud” or 
“deception.”242  These cases involve perjury,243 bribery,244 smuggling of 
 
 236.  See 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7) (2000). 
 237.  See id; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006) (Mail and wire fraud statutes, 
which are just one example of criminal statutes that involve fraud and are labeled as 
fraud in the title); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-1102(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012); see 
also MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-19-85 (2)(b)-(c) (2012). 
 238.  See 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7). 
 239.  See § 76-6-1102(2)(a); see also § 97-19-85. 
 240.  Developed in Ahmed v. Holder, 324 Fed. Appx. 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 241.  Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  See Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 262 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 244.  See id.; see also Okabe v. I.N.S., 671 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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persons,245 forgery,246 fraudulent use of a credit card,247 and defrauding 
the United States Government248 as crimes involving moral turpitude.249 
There is a critical distinction between the concepts of fraud and 
deception that the Fifth Circuit did not consider in Hyder.250  Hyder relies 
on the principle that “crimes whose essential elements involve fraud or 
deception tend to be crimes involving moral turpitude.”251  Despite this 
contention, the Fifth Circuit then relies solely on cases that involve both 
fraud and dishonesty.252  Unlike Beltran-Tirado and Hyder, each of the 
above cases involves conduct that induces another to act to their detriment 
or else involve deception in the form of a false swearing.253  No case of 
deception without fraud is cited. Nor is any case of deception without 
fraud for an otherwise legitimate purpose cited.254  There is no precedential 
support in Hyder for the conclusion that Mr. Hyder’s conduct, which 
involved naked dishonesty, must be a crime involving moral turpitude.  
 
 245.  See Fuentes-Cruz v. Gonzalez, 489 F.3d 724, 725 (5th Cir. 2007). This case 
also appears to not involve fraud, as the coyote does not induce another to act to his 
detriment. See United States v. Raghunandan, 587 F. Supp. 423, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(holding smuggling of aliens is a crime involving moral turpitude because the immorality 
is on par with false swearing or bigamy; the holding does not use fraud or deception as a 
justification, rather the root immorality of conduct); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006) 
(illegality of bringing in and harboring certain aliens). 
 246.  See Balogun v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 247.  See id. 
 248.  See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951). 
 249.  See Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 250.  See Ahmed v. Holder, 324 Fed. Appx. 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 251.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391. 
 252.  See id. 
 253.  Although a false swearing is dishonesty without fraud, the depravity of lying 
under oath elevates it to a crime involving moral turpitude, unlike other dishonesty. See 
Katherine Annuschat, An Affair to Remember: The State of the Crime of Adultery in the 
Military, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1161, 1180 (2010) (explaining that false swearing is an 
offense that involves a degree of moral turpitude, whereas lying may be dishonest but is 
not per se wrongful or discreditable); see also Boraca v. Schlotfeldt, 109 F.2d 106, 108 
(7th Cir. 1940) (holding perjury is a crime involving moral turpitude because of its 
nature as a crime against the government); Harms, supra note 28, at 269 (proposition that 
crimes against the government that are crimes involving moral  turpitude “include 
counterfeiting, perjury, willful tax evasion, bribery, impersonating a government official, 
and unlawful use of the mails”) 
 254.  See Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179, 1183–85 (9th Cir. 2000).  The 
question of whether crimes of deception without fraud and for an otherwise legal 
purpose constitutes crimes involving moral turpitude was the real issue that the Beltran-
Tirado and Hyder courts needed to narrowly consider. See id.; Hyder, 506 F.3d at 390; 
Circuit Review Staff, supra note 114, at 401. 
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There is even less precedential support for a finding that naked dishonesty 
for an otherwise legitimate purpose must constitute moral turpitude.255  
Despite the distinctions and the lack of directly applicable precedent, the 
Fifth Circuit in Hyder ruled that because misuse of a Social Security 
number for an otherwise legitimate purpose involved dishonesty, crimes 
of naked dishonesty are necessarily crimes involve moral turpitude.256 
A possible explanation for this irreconcilable result is the confusion 
surrounding the legal standard used in Hyder.  Based on the above 
definition, the first prong of fraud requires a knowing misrepresentation 
of the truth or concealment of a material fact.257  A misrepresentation or 
concealment of material fact are both instances of dishonesty, and therefore, 
where there is fraud, there will necessarily be dishonesty.  The Fifth Circuit 
disjunctively used the terms “dishonesty” and “fraud” to determine if 
misuse of a Social Security number is a crime involving moral turpitude.258  
However, since all fraudulent acts involve dishonesty, there is overlap 
between the terms.  Perhaps this overlap was a source of confusion. 
The Hyder opinion begins with the initial premise that in the precedents, 
all crimes of fraud have involved moral turpitude.259  The Hyder opinion 
also adds the principle that all crimes involving fraud will include the 
element of dishonesty.  Here lies the logical error: that all crimes of 
dishonesty therefore involve fraud.  This flawed step provides the 
necessary basis for the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that all crimes of 
dishonesty must therefore involve moral turpitude.  The Hyder court 
believed it was looking at conduct and precedents that all involved both 
dishonesty and fraud, as such they were in the same category of conduct.  
In actuality, the court looked at deceptive conduct, which is distinguishable 
from the precedents involving fraud.  Without the flawed logical step 
that all crimes of dishonesty involve fraud, the Fifth Circuit would not 
have considered itself bound by precedent to conclude that all crimes of 
dishonesty must involve moral turpitude. 
For an analogous logic chain using simpler terms, consider the following: 
all tigers are mammals, but not all mammals are tigers.  Similarly, all 
crimes of fraud involve deception, but not all instances of deception are 
fraudulent.  Had there been no logical error, the Fifth Circuit would have 
concluded that Mr. Hyder’s conduct involved dishonesty without fraud, 
 
 255.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391.  The Hyder court does not purport to extend the 
definition of fraud, dishonesty, or moral turpitude. Instead, the Hyder court simply holds 
that, based on the Fifth Circuit precedents and the Supreme Court’s decision in De 
George, crimes of dishonesty must involve moral turpitude. Id. 
 256.  See id. at 392. 
 257.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 731 (9th ed. 2009). 
 258.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391–92. 
 259.  See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951). 
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and thus the court would not have felt bound to find that Mr. Hyder’s 
naked dishonesty was a crime involving moral turpitude.  It is only due 
to faulty reasoning—perhaps confusion concerning the overlapping 
definitions of fraud and deception—that the Fifth Circuit felt bound to 
disagree with the Ninth Circuit in Beltran-Tirado and conclude that misuse 
of a Social Security number for an otherwise legitimate purpose is a 
crime involving moral turpitude.260 
A.  It’s the Summer of De George: Understanding the Key                      
Precedent the Fifth Circuit Relied Upon in Hyder 
In the principal case Hyder relied on, Jordan v. De George, the United 
States Supreme Court narrowly analyzed the term “moral turpitude” in 
the context of fraud.261  Decided a half-century before Hyder, De George 
and its progeny seemingly provided the basis for the Fifth Circuit’s 
conclusion in Hyder that misuse of a Social Security number for an 
otherwise legitimate purpose is a crime involving moral turpitude.262 
In Jordan v.  De George, an Italian citizen had resided in the United 
States for nearly two decades when he pleaded guilty to a conspiracy 
involving eight charged defendants to violating twelve sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code.  Specifically, fraudulently selling alcohol and 
evading liquor taxes, possession of alcohol “with intent to sell it in fraud 
of law and evade the tax thereon . . . with intent to defraud the United States 
of the tax thereon.”263  The alien, Mr. De George served 366 days for his 
conviction.  Nonetheless, within a year of release he resumed his illegal 
activities.  He was once again convicted of the same offenses and served 
two more years imprisonment.264  After a full summer of immigration 
 
 260.  The Hyder court makes no assertion that it purports to expand upon or create 
new law. Hyder, 506 F.3d at 392.  The Fifth Circuit justifies Hyder decision based on the 
strict adherence to decisional law. Id. 
 261.  See De George, 341 U.S. at 226. 
 262.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391. 
 263.  De George, 341 U.S. at 224. 
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United 
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or 
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect [sic] the 
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title  or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 371. 
 264.  See De George, 341 U.S. at 224–25. 
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hearings,265 the BIA ordered Mr. De George deported based on two 
separate convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude.266  As such, 
Mr. De George filed a habeas corpus petition seeking relief claiming that 
his crimes did not involve moral turpitude, and thus he was not 
deportable.267 
At the outset of the De George opinion, Justice Vinson writes that the 
case concerns only one question, “whether conspiracy to defraud the 
United States of taxes on distilled spirits is a crime involving moral 
turpitude[.]”268  Justice Vinson limits the holding further by writing “our 
inquiry in this case in narrowed to determining whether this particular 
offense involves moral turpitude.  Whether or not certain other offenses 
involve moral turpitude is irrelevant and beside the point.”269 
In the Court’s decision, Justice Vinson explained that where fraud 
exists, the circuits have always found moral turpitude.270  This is the 
result in analysis of both federal and state offenses.271  Because federal 
courts have consistently found that crimes of fraud also involve moral 
turpitude, Mr. De George’s crime of conspiring to defraud the United 
States therefore necessarily involved moral turpitude as well.272 
It is important to note that the De George opinion never explicitly 
holds that all offenses with an element of fraud necessarily involve 
moral turpitude, it merely says that the element of fraud has always been 
 
 265.  United States ex rel. De George v. Jordan, 183 F.2d 768, 769 (7th Cir. 1950) 
overruled by De George, 341 U.S. at 223. 
 266.  See De George, 341 U.S. at 225; see also INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.     
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1999). 
 267.  De George, 341 U.S. at 226. 
 268.  Id. at 223–24 (internal quotations omitted). 
 269.  Id. at 226–27 (emphasis added). 
 270.  See id. at 227.  See also Bermann v. Reimer, 123 F.2d 331, 332 (2d Cir. 1941) 
(obtaining goods under fraudulent pretenses); Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122, 123 (10th 
Cir. 1938) (conspiracy to defraud by deceit and falsehood); United States ex rel. Popoff 
v. Reimer, 79 F.2d 513, 515 (1935) (forgery with intent to defraud); Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F. 
Supp. 736, 737–38 (D. Mass. 1934) (using the mails to defraud); United States ex rel. 
Millard v. Tuttle, 46 F.2d 342, 345 (D. La. 1930) (execution of chattel mortgage with 
intent to defraud); United States ex rel. Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1928) 
(concealing assets in bankruptcy); United States ex rel. Portada v. Day, 16 F.2d 328 
(S.D.N.Y. 1926) (issuing checks with intent to defraud). In the state courts, crimes involving 
fraud have universally been held to involve moral turpitude . . . crime of conspiracy to 
violate the internal revenue laws by possessing and concealing distilled spirits with intent 
to defraud the United States of taxes, . . . the crime of smuggling alcohol into the United 
States with intent to defraud the United States involves moral turpitude.  See, e.g., De 
George, 341 U.S. at 228–29. 
 271.  See De George, 341 U.S. at 228. 
 272.  See id. at 229.  Further, the De George court held that the term moral turpitude 
is not void for vagueness. Id. at 229–32. 
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found to involve moral turpitude.273  Neither De George nor any other 
United States Supreme Court decision has declared that moral turpitude 
necessarily inheres in crimes where fraud is an element.274  Additionally, 
the De George holding was explicitly limited to whether or not the 
conspiracy to defraud the United States of taxes on certain liquors is a 
crime involving moral turpitude, and further expressly declared that 
offenses other than Mr. De George’s are beside the point of the not included 
in the opinion.275 
B. De George and Accompanying Cases Involved Fraud, and Were 
Thereby Not Binding on Hyder’s Naked Dishonesty 
Despite the De George opinion’s explicit limitations to the contrary, it 
is often the basis for the argument that misuse of a Social Security 
number for an otherwise legal purpose is a crime involving moral turpitude.  
Indeed, in Hyder, the Fifth Circuit cited De George for the principle that 
“fraud has consistently been regarded as such a contaminating component 
in any crime that American courts have, without exception, included 
such crimes within the scope of moral turpitude.”276  The Hyder opinion 
explained that because Mr. Hyder was convicted of a crime involving 
deception as an essential element, his conviction is therefore a crime 
involving moral turpitude. 
The Hyder Court based its decision on two other Fifth Circuit decisions 
which did not rely on De George.277  In Balogun v.  Ashcroft, an alien was 
convicted in Alabama state court for illegal possession of credit cards, 
fraudulent use of credit cards, and forgery.  The Balogun court determined 
these offenses were crimes involving moral turpitude.278  The Hyder Court 
relied on Balogun to support the proposition that crimes of fraud or 
deception are crimes involving moral turpitude.279 
In Omagah v. Ashcroft, an alien was convicted of testifying falsely 
under oath, attempting to purchase a green card from an Immigration 
 
 273.  See id. at 227. 
 274.  See id. at 227–28. 
 275.  See id. at 223–24, 226–27. 
 276.  Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing De George, 341 
U.S. at 229). 
 277.  See Balogun v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d 274, 278–79 n.15 (5th Cir. 2001); Omagah 
v. Ashcroft 288 F.3d 254, 260 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 278.  See Balogun, 270 F.3d at 276. 
 279.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391 (citing Balogun, 270 F.3d at 278–79). 
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and Naturalization Service undercover agent, and attempting to pay the 
agent to change INS computer records.  The Omagah court determined 
these offenses were crimes involving moral turpitude.280  The Hyder Court 
relied on Omagah to show that offenses of “intentional  deceit” are 
necessarily crimes involving moral turpitude.281 
The conduct in Omagah, Balogun, De George, as well as other federal 
circuit opinions, determine the presence of crimes involving moral turpitude 
based on unquestionable fraudulence or a basis other than deception.282  
However, the Fifth Circuit used those cases to find Mr. Hyder’s 
procurement of a driver’s license through misuse of a Social Security 
number was a crime involving moral turpitude, using deception as the 
basis.283  The Hyder court, purporting to be strictly bound by precedent, 
included crimes of deception without fraud in the fraud category.284  As 
such, the Fifth Circuit applied incorrect faulty analysis to Mr. Hyder’s 
status, and found that naked dishonesty is a crime involving moral 
turpitude.285 
Had Hyder been characterized as an expansion of the crimes involving 
moral turpitude to include dishonesty without fraud, this conclusion that 
 
 280.  See Omagah, 288 F.3d at 262. 
 281.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391 (citing Omagah, 288 F.3d at 261–62). 
 282.  In Omagah, the alien’s false testimony and attempted bribery were independent 
crimes involving moral turpitude under the law because they were attempts to defraud 
the United States. Omagah, 288 F.3d at 262; see also United States ex rel. Boraca v. 
Schlotfeldt, 109 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1940) (holding that perjury is a crime involving 
moral turpitude because it is a false statement under oath to an officer of the United 
States government); Harms, supra note 28.  In Balogun, the alien induced merchants and 
creditors to make purchases with credit that the alien had no intent to satisfy. Balogun, 
270 F.3d at 275.  In De George, the alien evaded taxes on his illegal enterprise.  De 
George, 341 U.S. at 224.  Both De George and the Balogun statutes are inherently 
fraudulent, therefore fraud provided the basis for the conduct to involve moral turpitude. 
See id. (concerning 18 U.S.C. § 88; Balogun, 270 F.3d at 276 (concerning 42 U.S.C.      
§ 408(g)(2)). 
 283.  None of the cases cited in Hyder or De George involve conduct so innocuous 
or—assuming arguendo that fraud was present—of minimal fraudulence, as the conduct 
in Hyder. See De George, 341 U.S. at 227–29; Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391.  However, the 
Fifth Circuit did not consider “particular circumstances surrounding [Mr. Hyder’s] conviction, 
such as the light sentence and [Mr. Hyder’s] possible lack of a vicious motive.”  Hyder, 
506 F.3d at 392.  Instead the Fifth Circuit only considered the crime as written under the 
statute rather than the surrounding circumstances. See id. at 391–92.  In fact, the Fifth 
Circuit appears to take a simple categorical approach. See Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 600 
(1990). Could the Fifth Circuit have found Mr. Hyder’s conduct was not a crime 
involving moral turpitude, had the other circumstances of Mr. Hyder’s conviction been 
considered based on the controversial Silva-Trevino method? See Matter of Silva-
Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693, 700 (B.I.A. 2008); supra notes 108–13, and accompanying 
discussion. 
 284.  See Hyder, 506 F.3d at 391–92. 
 285.  See id. at 392. 
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the Fifth Circuit need not find misuse of a Social Security for an otherwise 
legal purpose to be a crime involving moral turpitude would not stand.  
However, the Fifth Circuit did not expand or create law in Hyder, rather 
the Hyder opinion purported to be strictly bound by precedent.  Had the 
Fifth Circuit not improperly felt bound to follow precedent, there would 
be no contrary case law to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Beltran-Tirado.  
As such, the split should be resolved in favor of the Ninth Circuit.286 
VIII.  CONCLUSION: THE UNITED STATES NEEDS A NATIONAL RULE 
THAT MISUSE OF A SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER FOR                                              
AN OTHERWISE LEGAL PURPOSE IS NOT A CRIME                                      
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE 
Moral turpitude has a long history in United States immigration law of 
being poorly defined and providing inconsistent results.287  Elvira Arellano 
and Mr. Hyder were removed from the United States for their convictions 
for misuse of a Social Security number as crimes involving moral 
turpitude.288  Yet, under the same law, Ms. Beltran-Tirado’s conviction 
for misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise legitimate purpose 
was not a crime involving moral turpitude solely because her case was 
before a different federal court.289  It is contrary to the concept of morality 
that in one instance an act is moral, but just seven years later the same 
act is immoral.290  This inconsistency based on arbitrary circuit boundaries 
has a negative impact on the United States and its interaction with 
foreigners.291 
In Hyder, the Fifth Circuit relied on clear decisional law that fraud is 
always a crime involving moral turpitude, and therefore it was bound to 
find misuse of a Social Security number is a crime involving moral 
 
 286.  Assuming arguendo that the United States Supreme Court would decline to 
follow the fraud analysis above, a decision from the highest court resolving the split in 
favor of the Ninth Circuit would not be overruling the prior Supreme Court decision in 
De George. Recall De George did not hold that all fraud offenses are crimes involving 
moral turpitude, therefore a decision in agreement with the Ninth Circuit that holds misuse of 
a Social Security number for an otherwise legal purpose is not a crime involving moral 
turpitude would only overrule decisions of the various circuits. 
 287.  See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying discussion. 
 288.  See supra notes 10, 151 and accompanying discussion. 
 289.  See supra notes 122, 124 and accompanying discussion. 
 290.  See supra notes 222–25 and accompanying discussion. 
 291.  See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying discussion. 
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turpitude.292  However, the Fifth Circuit did not consider the critical 
distinction between fraud and dishonesty.293  In fact, related precedent 
does not provide that naked dishonesty—dishonesty without fraud—
must be a crime involving moral turpitude.294  Had the Fifth Circuit 
properly analyzed as the conduct as naked dishonesty rather than 
improperly as fraud, the Fifth Circuit would not have needed to find that 
misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise legal purpose is a 
crime involving moral turpitude.295  Because of the need for a resolution 
to whether misuse of a Social Security number for an otherwise legal 
purpose is a crime involving moral turpitude, the United States Supreme 
Court ought to provide an unequivocal national rule that misuse of a 
Social Security number for an otherwise legal purpose is not a crime 
involving moral turpitude.296 
 
 
 292.  See supra notes 240–49 and accompanying discussion. 
 293.  See supra notes 250–57 and accompanying discussion. 
 294.  See supra note 257 and accompanying discussion. 
 295.  See supra notes 283–86 and accompanying discussion. 
 296.  See supra note 287 and accompanying discussion. 
